Dealing with Diplomacy

The P5+1, that is the 5 most powerful states in the United Nations (UN) (France, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) plus Germany, have proposed multilateral diplomatic negotiations with Iran in regard to its nuclear regime. However, the United States Republican Party (GOP) disagree with diplomatic efforts and plan to sabotage the negotiations through blocking the proposal once it reaches the US Senate, and propose that strike attacks against Iran are a safer option than a nuclear-armed Iran (Kroenig, 2012). These diplomatic compromises may improve not only US and Iran relations, but Iran’s relations with the Western world as rather than its economy being sabotaged, an attempt at recuperation and peace-building could lead to a less nuclear-capable and less aggressive Iran, making room for peace-building in the Middle East.

Commencing initially in November 2013, the P5+1 negotiations essentially outline that Iran will be relieved of various international sanctions against it (within UN resolutions and otherwise) so long as Iran commits to a reduction in its nuclear production.  If the final settlement concludes in June 2015 as proposed, Iran will have pledge to diluting certain nuclear elements, limiting centrifuge connection and production, and freezing production of important elements in its stockpile, and abiding by non-proliferation guidelines, as outlined by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the IAEA guidelines (Garcia, Katzman, Kerr, Nikitin, 2015). However, the GOP immediately and overtly rejected US President Barack Obama’s proposal to sign the deal on the basis that Obama ‘is more interested in signing a deal—any deal—with Iran regardless of the deal’s effectiveness in stopping Iran from ever building a nuclear weapon.’ And that the deal will be a bad one that will ultimately allow Iran to continue its nuclear program and ultimately develop a nuclear weapon. (Cotton, 2015).Statements from GOP members and senators are in response to an open letter written and sent to the leaders of Iran that largely stated the pointlessness of agreeing to the P5+1 negotiations, as when Obama’s presidential term ends, legislation says that any US president maintains right to veto any previous binding deal and that Obama must have a two-third Senate majority to pass the bill initially anyway, which would not occur in the GOP-led Senate (United States Senate, 2015). Dramatically opposed to allowing Iran to continue (albeit at a far less progressive rate), GOP senators are plotting to sabotage any attempt at passing the bill, highlighting the deep vendetta held against Iran, as further articulated by Senator John Isakson, who would like to pursue further compensation from Iran for American diplomats taken more than 30 years ago (Broder, 2015). Other suggested alternatives, including Marco Rubio’s proposition whereby Iran must formally recognise Israel (an undoubted rejection) have all been termed ‘poison pill’s’ (Broder, 2015). These suggested alternatives, although some seeming diplomatic and based on negotiation, still fuel the aggression and hostility held towards Iran which will undoubtedly drive motivation to boost its nuclear programme, rather than at least try to slow it down and allow concessions.

The possibility of achieving complete non-proliferation is slim, especially considering that the P5 are all states that are officially recognised as possessing nuclear weapons (Arms Control Association, 2015). Furthermore, in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states that member states must ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament’ (Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968) rather than suggesting a full-blown missile strike against Iran, as Michael Kroenig proposes (Kroenig, 2012). Although Iran have not upheld the best reputation during its weaponised history (Landau & Stein, 2014), as Stephen Walt suggests, it is important to not simply try and find the ultimate solution, but to evaluate a series of responses and narrow it down to which approach carries the least amount of risk (Walt, 2011). Through the lens of conscious realism (Hoffman, 2008) on the political stage, it is clear to see that in regard to dichotomy of war versus diplomacy and negotiation, the objective reality is that diplomacy and negotiation are evidently superior to war and violence as a means of consensual and legitimate dispute settlement mechanisms. Iran insists that there is ‘no credible deterrence’ (JTA, 2014) to stop Iran’s nuclear programme, rather than presenting a threatening stance led by the somewhat exceptional U.S, the U.S’s idea to “lead from behind” (Indyk M. S., Lieberthal K. G. & Hanlon M. E. 2012) is a far more diplomatic effort from the P5+1 than to cease all negotiations, which could ‘increase the possibility that Iran would accelerate its nuclear program and that the United States or Israel would launch military strikes. The last thing we need is yet another war in the Middle East.’ (Collina, 2014).

With Iran being labelled as a sponsor of state terrorism and maintaining a hardliner posture, it is clear that remaining antagonistic when weaponry is involved, things will not only not move forward, but they will get more hostile. The GOP is stuck in a more aggressive era and needs to move towards a more calm and cautious stance to solve issues in a more covert manner through slow development rather than outright refusal.  The circumstances and proposals around Iran’s nuclear program are not ideal, however the P5+1 proposal is less damaging and is more sustainable and productive than one-way non-proliferation deals or blatant strike attacks. It also must be remembered that no one can see into the future and confidently articulate what the consequences of each manoeuvre will be.

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Collina, T. Z. (2014), Keep Calm Keep Talking to Iran, The National Interest, (accessed 20/5/2015)

Cotton, T. (2015), Sen. Cotton: Why We Wrote the Letter to Iran, USA Today, (accessed 20/5/2015)

Garcia M. J., Katzman, K., Kerr P. K., & Nikitin M. B. D. (2015), Iran: Interim Nuclear Agreement and Talks on a Comprehensive Accord, Congressional Research Service

Hoffman, D. (2008), Conscious Realism and the Mind-Body Problem, Mind & Matter Vol. 6(1), pp. 87–121, Imprint Academic

Indyk M. S., Lieberthal K. G. & Hanlon M. E. (2012), ‘Chapter Four: Middle East Peacemaking’, Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy, Brookings FOCUS

JTA (2014), Ted Cruz: Israel Could Strike Iran in Months, The Times of Israel (accessed 20/5/2015)

Kroenig, M. (2012), Time to Attack Iran: why a strike is the least bad option, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb issue, Council on Foreign Relations

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Walt, S. (2011), The Worst Case for War with Iran, Foreign Policy (accessed 20/5/2015)

Collective Security or Collective Defence? The Importance of Lexicology in Policy

Going against Article 9 of their Constitution (1947), the Japanese government has bilaterally decided with the United States (US) to amend its defence and security strategy in order to improve alliance efficiency. This strategic security tactic fundamentally alters Japan’s stance towards warfare and presents a more aggressive political posture. Discourse surrounding the development includes both terms of collective security and collective self-defence; differing concepts that are being treated as synonymous (Martin, 2015). Under international law, concepts of collective security and collective self-defence have distinct conditions which therefore have severe implications and consequences. The consequences of these new negotiations and cooperation can be seen on a broad scale in terms of US, China and Japan relations, but also more closely on a technical and syntactical level.

Opposing article 9 of the Japanese 1947 constitution which declared ‘the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes’ (Japanese Constitution, art. 9, 1947), The post-World War II period saw Japan’s 1952 US-Japan Security Treaty to be under pressure from both socialists, conservatives and even from the US. During May of 1960, Japanese conservatives sought a more balanced defence strategy that not only rearmed Japan, but allowed mutual defence between the US and Japan, and also granted Japan with more control over US forces (AFE, 2009). New negotiations on the original treaty committed the US to defend Japan if under attack but only at the permission or consultation of the Japanese. Despite continued Japanese insistence that US military presence in Japan was and still is essential for the protection of Japan, the motives of a post-war US which included incorporating old enemy states and rebalancing rising powers shone a new light on the beneficiaries of the new negotiations. This transition never really disappeared as in 2010 the Obama administration announced a new pivot towards Asia as it moved into ‘strengthening alliances’ and ‘deepening partnerships with emerging powers’ such as Japan, according to former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon (Donilon, 2013). This continuously strengthening alliance with Japan, including support for the administrative control of the Senkaku Islands, as affirmed by Hillary Clinton in 2010 and reaffirmed by President Barack Obama on the basis of article 5 of the new bilateral defence treaty (Obama, 2015). Supporting Japan on this issue could be detrimental to US-China relations, with which the US is also attempting to strengthen ties and renew alliance. How the US will improve ties with China while supporting Japan in its strive for South Sea Islands may be damaging to US relations with China, potentially causing more contingencies between China, the US and Japan itself.

The technicalities and rhetoric surrounding in the defence guidelines purposely make ambiguous the terms of which Japan and the US can come to each other’s defence and protection. Considering the guidelines have not yet been voted on or finalised, the implications are currently based on surrounding discourse which employs both the terms collective self-defence and collective security (Martin, 2015). It is dangerous to think that both these terms could be used in the final guideline proposal as these terms collective self-defence and collective security are not synonymous. [Collective] Self-defence is justified under article 51 of the United Nations (UN) charter, therefore almost any attack that Japan may pursue could essentially rely upon the [collective] self-defence ruling (United Nations Charter, 1945). Collective security is a much broader scope and is rationalised under article 42 of the UN charter as necessary (at UN discretion) if there is threat to international security and order (United Nations Charter, 1945). If in the new defence guidelines, both terms collective self-defence and collective security were to be used, it essentially justifies any armed attack Japan takes against anyone on the basis that they too had pursued an attack. Given that the guidelines were negotiated in conjunction with the US, it would indeed permit Japan to engage in any use of force that is initiated by the US, without necessary permission or authorization from the UN. The Japanese government has tried to give very specific examples of what these conditions would permit them to such as ballistic missiles being launched at the US. However other ambiguous language such as ‘international peace cooperation activities’ (Martin, 2015) tend to blur the real guidelines and conditions for the agreement. It must be made clear the correct usage of terms collective self-defence and collective security and which is used in the final guidelines as each have their own severe implications and consequences not only for the US-Japan alliance, but for the entire global political stage.

Although the new defence guidelines are an attempt at not only strengthening US-Japan ties, tightening Japan’s defence and acquiring a more efficient response to contingencies, it seems that the implications of said guidelines have other agendas. The US’s interest in embracing its relations with Japan seems to act as a forefront for a US geo-strategic position in the Asian region, in accordance with its bold pivot towards Asia. It is crucial that the technicalities and rhetoric surrounding the negotiations are clearly defined and separated so as not to blur the conditions in order to find loopholes for the benefit of the US or Japan’s foreign relations and policy instruments.

AFE (2009) Article 9 and the US-Japan Security Treaty, ‘Asia for Educators’, Columbia University, (accessed 15/5/2015)

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United Nations (1945), Charter of the United Nations, VII 51, (accessed 15/5/2015)

American Exceptionalism as an Inherent Ingredient in U.S Foreign Policy

Realists argue that the United States (U.S) acts out of its own need for self-help and preservation in the nature of the competitive global political arena. However, as crystallised by the Bush administration, the notion of American Exceptionalism is a significant driving force in US foreign policy. Although realism may hold an undertone in US foreign policy, the entitled position that the U.S has constructed for itself has derived from the deeply rooted history and rhetoric surrounding religion, manifest destiny, responsibility and expansion that has now morphed into the belief of Exceptionalism. These manifestations of a common theme have been exemplified throughout U.S history, in particular the 20th century, however this discussion intends to focus on the Bush administration and Doctrine that used Exceptionalism as a guide to action in foreign policy, the use of force, the War on Terror and its rhetoric and the all-embracing spread of American freedom and democracy.

American Exceptionalism is argued to be adapted from the complex relationship between the U.S constitution and the vast Christian population that it governed. The American independence and the creation of the Constitution was built on the political experiment that would ideally create the perfect republic in which the American population would be granted the ultimate liberties and individual rights (Encyclopaedia of the New American Nation). This was an attempt at a separation from the ‘Old World’ that was Europe to the New World Order; a democratic republic that strove to avoid the class conflicts and socialism of Eastern Europe at the time (Tyrrell, 1991). Inextricably linked with this idea of separation is the U.S’s responsibility to lead the rest of the world to this New World Order in the political realm; as if enlightening the rest of the world to the greater political good that is democracy (Ceasar, 2012). The term ‘exceptional’ implies unique; different; special in either holding a certain quality or in determination of a certain pursuit (Caesar, 2012). Contextually-speaking, the government and Constitution of the U.S as a new world nation was unique and thus ‘overtones of natural superiority’ (Tyrrell, 1991, pg. 1034) and leadership were realised. ‘At the heart of this difference is religion’ and ‘the durability of American religious beliefs’ (Galston, 2014). During the American Westward expansion period in the early 1800s, the concept of a Manifest Destiny as a part of God’s plan, America’s pursuit of fulfilment and “in essence the doctrine that one nation has a preeminent social worth, a distinctively lofty mission, and consequently, unique rights in the application of moral principles.” (Weinberg, 1935, pg. 8). The territorial expansion of the United States was essentially a sign that the spread of U.S freedom and democracy must spread all over the globe, and this was certainly continued through the centuries following the initial acquisition of the American continent. It is pursuits such as these that are consequences of the sacred association of exceptional U.S foreign policy. However, the term ‘Exceptionalism’ was not discussed until Alexis De Tocqueville in his ‘Democracy in America’ wrote that ‘The position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one’ (De Tocqueville, 1840, pg. 31). This was following on from Joseph Stalin’s ironic comment that the U.S was the exception in not having any presence of social classes or socialism (Friedman, 2012). During his presidency in 2001-2009, U.S President George Bush exemplified how the belief and now ideology of American Exceptionalism shaped U.S foreign policy through claimed responsibility, entitlement and leadership in spreading ‘the blessings of freedom and democracy with others around the world’ (Land, 2010).

When George W. Bush was inaugurated on January 20th of 2001, he delivered a bold and promising inaugural speech ensuring that America’s ‘faith in freedom and democracy was a rock in a raging sea’ (Bush, 2001). Bush boldly declared that ‘If our country does not lead the cause of freedom, it will not be led’, a blatant appeal to the Exceptional position and responsibility to lead the world in the image of America; as if without America, freedom and progress would not occur. The presidential transfer to Bush was seen in in many eyes as a revolution, one that both threw off constraints from its allies and utilised its strength to progress and inspire the rest of the world (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). After the events of September 11 2001, four coordinated terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre Towers and the Pentagon, it was clear that U.S foreign policy and foreign policy discussions would be changed forever. The Bush Doctrine had now developed into notions of pre-emptive and preventative war, the War on Terror, the spread of democracy, exemptions from international law and norms so that ‘The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom.’ (Bush, 2001). This paradigm shift in foreign policy provided a more aggressive direction of action, laced with religious rhetoric exemplified in Bush’s ‘We are not this story’s author, who fills time and eternity with his purpose. Yet his purpose is achieved in our duty’. Such emphasis on U.S fulfilment and duty to lead the course of action seemed to provide God’s warrant for U.S unilateralism and practices in its foreign policy.  In Bush’s rhetoric lies distinct manifestations of the Exceptionalist position in terms of Bush’s feeling of being the exception to international law, the need to take the lead in the War on Terror, dismantling governing bodies in the Middle East so as to implement democracy, and creating false dichotomies of the U.S versus terrorism. These expeditions of unipolarity during the Bush administration were an exhibit of possible manifest destiny.

President George Bush and his approach to foreign policy was an evident illustration to American Exceptionalism and in particular, entitlement. When the Kyoto protocol was adopted and negotiations were being made under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in December 1997, tensions arose between negotiators, notably the European Union and the U.S regarding restrictions and targets for the reduction of Greenhouse Gases, of which the U.S emitted a total of 6503.8 million tonnes (Freeland, 2001). Shortly after his inauguration in 2001, George Bush, although ‘committed to a leadership role’ in climate change (The Economist, 2001), announced that the U.S would be withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol on the basis that it would be detrimental to the U.S economy, that scientific foundations were insufficient and agreements made by other major emitters such as China and India were not binding enough (Freeland, 2001). This contemporary example of the U.S feeling constrained by terms of the rest of the world, rather than terms of their own, is a perceived attempt at the European Old World trying to dominate the New (Cox & Stokes, 2012), not in a territorial sense, but in a political one, and from Bush’s perspective an economic one also. The U.S withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol at the leadership of George Bush is a particular case that pertains to American Exceptionalism and its characteristic of entitlement and leadership. While a withdrawal from a less-developed nation may not have been as consequential, considering US support was highly prioritised (Freeland, 2001), George Bush went on to claim that the Kyoto Protocol was essentially ‘dead’ (The Economist, 2001). Political discourse such as this assumes that without the U.S support, there is no state that is as successful or committed as the U.S, as if to say it would have no progress without U.S support. This is perhaps due to global environmental law and its terms differing because the consequences of one states non-compliance in a climate treaty is far more severe upon other states, rather than simply not having support (Chalecki, 2007). ‘This means that a one non-party nation can render the entire regime ineffective’ (Chalecki, 2007, pg. 15). As supported by Elizabeth Chalecki, George Bush’s decision to withdraw from the Kyoto protocol was a concrete example of aspects of Exceptionalism such as wanting to criticise other states, gaining exceptions or exemptions for U.S practises and most importantly avoidance or isolation from legal jurisdictions (Ignatieff, 2005).

After the wake of the September 11 attacks in 2001, George Bush declared that ‘America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world’ and that it was time to protect the ‘justice and peace’ that America supposedly stands for (Bush, 2001). It was during this speech that Bush referred to the pivotal turning point in U.S foreign policy as the ‘War on Terror’ or the ‘War on terrorism’ (Stokes, 2009). It was declared and frequently reinforced that ‘America has stood down enemies before, and will do so again this time’ and that ‘America will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts, and those who harbour them’ (Bush, 2001). It was this shift from political containment to an overt and aggressive ideology of anti-terrorism; as if creating and deterring terrorism provided a justification of U.S intervention and war (Stokes, 2009). These notions were put into legal action with the publishing of Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS) in September, 2002 which announced the validation for attack with the introduction of prevention and pre-emption (Freedman, 2006). During his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush declared that he would ‘not wait on events, while dangers gather’ (Bush, 2002). The NSS articulated links between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and states that had Weapons of Mass Destruction capacities and capabilities, and it was the ultimate objective of the NSS to achieve full military superiority to an exceptional point where no other threatening states would have means to reach the same military capacities as the U.S and therefore deter them from attacking again (Stokes, 2009). Eventually, it was realised that the Bush needed some form of foreign support and so the Coalition of the willing was formed as an appeared multilateral effort, obviously led by the U.S (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). President Bush felt that the U.S’s ‘responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil’ (Bush, 2001). Presenting the War on Terror in such a dichotomous way not only assumed the preventative and pre-emptive attacks were the only pathway to defeating terrorism, but also put the idea of a global concept such as terrorism, on the same level as a state, concluding that the U.S was in fact as powerful as terrorism and was going to be more so. The unipolarity disguised as the Coalition of the willing is a distinct illustration of the Bush administration’s claim to Exceptionalism. The abolishment of global terrorism was going to be Bush’s vision of America as the exceptional state whose pursuit of terrorism and global democracy needed to be fulfilled as its manifest destiny, and without U.S leadership in said pursuit, the world could not progress.

Following the announcement of the global War on Terror, the U.S intervention in Iraq in 2003 was an explicit demonstration of America’s supposed Exceptionalist position. Manifestations of American Exceptionalism including unconditional commitment and determination to a certain mission or pursuit (Ceaser, 2012), such as the War on Terror, meant that the U.S would stop at nothing ‘come hell or high water’ (Sloan, 2008, pg. 4) to fulfil their political, moral and religious obligation. The intervention was prompted by the belief that Iraq was harbouring both Saddam Hussien, who was at the time believed to be partially responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and harbouring and building weapons of mass destruction (WMD). By presenting the Iraq intervention as positively fighting terrorism and simultaneously promoting supposed freedom and democracy, the U.S’s right to intervene seemed almost unquestionable and President Bush believed that the intrusion was far too urgent for even the United Nations Security Council’s investigations of Iraq’s WMDs to be completed. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter articulates that an attack or intervention is only reasonable under pretences of proportionality and direct imminence of an attack or threat (United Nations Charter, 1945). However, the belief that Saddam Hussien was both building and harbouring WMDs was in fact incorrect, and the U.S’s involvement based on self-defence and pre-emption and prevention was now in fact a full-blown attack. One understanding of Exceptionalism is to believe that one is exempt from universal standards of morality or right and wrong (Bromwich, 2014). In the events surrounding the U.S intervention in Iraq it is simple to see that President Bush believed that America was in a position that was above moral and legal right and wrong in the standards of universally binding institutions such as the United Nations, as well as questioned its authority over U.S foreign policy (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). In addition to this, it is often difficult to justify a war or invasion to the public, therefore by presenting to the masses as if the war on terror as not only a false dichotomy, but also an appeal to the exceptional nature of American people, Bush was able to rationalise the War on Terror to the American public.

Following the intervention in Iraq, a view that is widely held is that the Bush administration held no exit strategy and that Bush and his closest advisors felt that it would be best leave just as quickly as they arrived with no reconstruction effort (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). However, in a quick thought transition, the Bush administration decided that part of the fight against terrorism would be to oust the current governing system and hold an election to implement a new leader and democratic government, based on the Democratic Peace Theory (Kant, 1795) and ‘undertake active measures to spread its universal political values and institutions’ (Harland, 2013, pg. 51). Robert Miller argues that there are three main components to the ideal of a Manifest Destiny: the special virtues of the American people and their institutions; America’s mission to redeem and remake the world in the image of America; and a divine destiny under God’s direction to accomplish this wonderful task’ (Miller, 2006, pg. 120). In January 2005 George Bush announced that after the first democratic elections held in Iraq that ‘the world is hearing the voice of freedom’ and that ‘By participating in free elections, the Iraqi people have firmly rejected the anti-democratic ideology of the terrorists’ (Alexander & Saadi, 2005). As Ceaser suggests, at some point in history the Exceptionalist idea of a mission somehow got skewed with ideals of American freedom and democracy (Ceaser, 2012) as a justification for democratisation around the world. Although allies expressed support for a war against terrorism, not necessarily all agreed on such pursuit and determination in disabling a government system and implementing American democratic policy; these were claimed expressions of concern for U.S hegemony (Warren, 2012). The revolutionary pursuit of a state and the rhetoric surrounding it exemplified the exceptional shift from a post-Cold War containment era to a foreign policy that made no distinction between states and terrorism and therefore felt that the only escape from terrorism was to implement the virtues of American liberty, in hope that such ‘a religiously inspired errand to promote liberty or liberal democracy in the world’ (Ceaser, 2012, pg. 8) would succeed in dogmatically promoting America’s image. Moreover, the sentiment that the U.S possesses in being separate from the Old World and being blessed with a religious and political mission to reform the world order (McDougall, 2012), was a direct driver in Bush’s decision to not only invade but restore a new political order in Iraq.

Since its first coining of the term, originally referring to the uniqueness of America’s conception, American Exceptionalism has been exaggerated as a guide to action in U.S foreign policy. The progress-oriented concept of a New World Order provided a political platform for the U.S, in particular the Bush administration to dramatically shift from a containment-based political posture to an overt, more aggressive and unipolar actions in regard to terrorism and asymmetrical warfare, deemed as the biggest threats to U.S security and leadership on the global political arena. Since the event of 9/11, President Bush’s foreign policy was dominated by discourse and decisions made to protect the exceptional liberties of the U.S, it is evident that the use of a supposed religious and therefore obligatory purpose as a foreign policy instrument was ambitiously adopted by the Bush administration, but was also ineffective as a idolatrous grand strategy of the Bush administration in attempt to reach a supposed unipolar moment in the name of American Exceptionalism.

The impossibilities of living in a society and achieving ultimate individual freedom

Individual freedom is not possible in a civil society as the coming together to create a society, and the means of protecting a society requires some restrictions of freedom itself.

In Immanuel Kant’s Ideas of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, he argues that it is impossible for man to achieve his full potential unless all the strength and power of mankind is combined to create a society (Kant, 2010). It is then that the realist, self-interested practices that aim to achieve power and wealth must be put aside for the interest and preservation of the common good (Kant, 2010). The idea of absolute individual freedom is consistently restrained by consequences and prior events, commonly known in the philosophy world as The Problem of Free Will. The concept of absolute individual freedom without constraint would require the abandonment of human reason influencing the individual’s behaviour. In a society where there are numerous influences such as the media, the environment and finance, avoiding all influences and abandoning human reason in order to attain individual liberty.

The dynamic sociological model of identity argues that the idea of self is socially constructed through discourse and context. The model by Stets and Burke also argues that the self is reflective of the society it is in and vice versa (Stets & Burke, 2003). The concept of a society is built upon the organisation of a community of people in a more or less ordered way. If the self is reflective of a society, then absolute individual freedom cannot exist or it would lead to a congregation of realist individuals exercising unconditional freedom and therefore not progressing toward the common good. This construct and structure supports that ‘man is born free but sacrifices some of these freedoms for the preservation of a state as a whole’ (Rousseau, 1762). In this case, the ‘state’ would be society in general, by which although the individual will have his own aims and interest, true common good or social sovereignty (not state sovereignty) should overpower man’s complete and utter individual freedom in society.

Freedom and suppression are inextricably linked in today’s society. State societies often argue that suppression is used as a mechanism for freedom of the society as a whole (Harvey, 2014). Harvey also argues that ‘to be free, someone else needs to be suppressed and exploited’. These repressive practices are blatantly obvious in the 21st century such as in sweatshops in Eastern countries for example China, India and other Asian countries exhibit atrocious working conditions for not just adults but children also. These practices are often exploited by larger Western states, where freedom of choice and liberty ‘provides a license, it seems, to engage in a large range of repressive practices’ (Harvey, 2014). This idea of a society ensuring the safety of its members is also exacerbated with the 2004 legislations passed in Australia regarding data surveillance (EFA, 2004) where it was insisted that the Australian Surveillance Intelligence Organisation needed to have access to data and location tracking for the security, well-being and safety of Australia. Such surveillance is a concrete contemporary case where the sacrifice of individual privacy and freedom was crucial to the interest of the society.

Michel Foucault (1997) writes that it is not until all socially-constructed limits are realized and avoided that true freedom, or ‘ethos’ can be achieved. In a contemporary, interdependent society, ignoring the copious amounts of social influences for the freedom of a single individual is impossible, due to the way a society itself is constructed.

The Overriding Principle of State Sovereignty can no Longer Apply in a World of Borderless, Global Risks

Globalisation’s forces including increased fluidity of goods, capital, labour, mobility and communication, as well as the escalation of global risks and third-agenda issues, are now outdating the traditional or Westphalian idea of state sovereignty.

The two elements of state sovereignty, internal and external, both exert supreme authority over its territorial domain and have no higher power to answer to, as well as external sovereignty referring to a state’s autonomy in how it conducts itself on the international arena. However, often sovereignty is only acknowledged on an international level and not on a domestic one (Tansey, 2007). It is through the intensification of communication that the people of a state are becoming more aware and active in discussion about domestic and global policy. This shift causes a decentralization of internal sovereignty from the Westphalian aristocracy as governing body, to a socially democratic society having more influence over its authority. As Stiglitz illustrates, it is this ‘well-orchestrated public pressure’ that forces the authorities to adjust public and global policy (Stiglitz, pg. 5, 2003). Furthermore, it is the breakdown of these constructed state barriers that expose the political and economic policy of a state to the rest of the world, diminishing its privacy and overall sovereignty.

The challenges of globalisation that have arisen including those that are natural such as disease and climate change or global warming, have proved that there are some instances where sovereignty is irrelevant. Global crises such as those aforementioned threaten the globe as a whole and therefore it is in every state’s interest and obligation to act for the benefit and safety of the world as a whole, all self-interest aside. For example, with the recent 2014 outbreak of the Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa, Australia was not sending over healthcare personnel in fear that they would contract the virus, return to Australia and it would spread. However, Greens Senator Richard Di Natale contended that there were to be ‘no more excuses’ in regard to sovereignty-oriented inaction by the Australian government (Di Natale, 2014). Additionally, only recently has the discussion of environmental degradation and resource depletion come into political discourse. The action that needs to be taken in light of these limits to growth need to be considered as a shared responsibility, and that a state’s external sovereignty and self-interested [economic] pursuits need to be waived for the greater good of the collective society. These crises and threats to the twenty-first century ‘defy borders’ (Pascal & Benner, pg. 17, 2012).

One of the greatest forces to weaken sovereignty that resulted from globalisation is the largely influential institutions of global governance. The aim of governing the entire stage of sovereign states largely says enough about its achievement of diminishing a state’s ability to autonomously conduct itself on the international arena (Tansey, 2007). A blatant example is that of the conditionality (Stiglitz, 2003) that comes with international trade agreements. By attempting to enter a fair trade negotiation, a state may have to implement domestic policies against their will in order to gain the benefits of an international trade agreement, such as was the case in the 2001 World Trade Organisation’s Doha Development Rounds (Bayoumi, 2011).

In a more interconnected world than ever, it is impossible for the traditional or Westphalian concept of state sovereignty to have as stronger role thanks to the breakdown of traditional state barriers and the emergence of new, globally-concerning issues.

Does the United Nations Live up to any of the Ideals of Cosmopolitanism?

The concept of cosmopolitanism focuses on the promotion of ideals of equality, binding common humanity and therefore universal law and reason. The United Nations as an institution of global governance is an honest and exceptional attempt at pursuing these cosmopolitan ideals in both intention and natural unification.

The United Nations (UN) was constructed after the atrocities of World War II and was aimed at becoming a global government that strived to maintain international peace and security (UN, 1945). In order to do this, it needed to be concrete what the role of the UN Security Council was in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of peace-keeping and possible preventative action. However, in order to do so, the concept of global governance is dependent on overcoming the autonomy of the state; its sovereignty. As stated in article 53 of the UN Charter, it is at the UN’s authority to ensure that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council”. This is a distinct manifestation of cosmopolitan ideals in that the safety and moral worth of all human beings are of fundamental concern ‘irrespective of group membership’ (Fabre, pg. 965, 2008), and therefore it is at the UN’s determination (not the state’s) to ensure the safety of all global citizens.

The UN has received much criticism on its political rhetoric becoming distorted to ‘UN-approved code of conduct’ or more harshly, ‘the United Nations is already plotting its next invasion to deal with the fallout’ (Wolverton, 2012). This kind of disapproval brought about discussion of a linguistic shift from the right to intervene to the introduction of a state’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The UN’s R2P doctrine aims to promote more cosmopolitan practices within the UN by ensuring each individual state’s responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild (ICRtoP, 2005). This focus to a more human-rights based approach to intervention and prevention is fundamentally cosmopolitan in the way that it treats the safety and value of each human being and their right to feel protected. The UN then insists that if the state is unwilling or unable to uphold the responsibility that is obligatory to its sovereignty, then it is the role of the international community to protect its citizens (IDRC, 2001).

Immanuel Kant’s fourth proposition of cosmopolitanism is that individuals are continuously inclined to come together to create societal order as resistance to what threatens the society itself. Furthermore, Kant argues that the greatest task for mankind is to come together and abandon ‘a lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could derive its security and rights, not from its own power or its own legal judgement, but solely from this great federation, this united power, and the law-governed decisions of a united will’ (Kant, pg.20, 2010). The primary objectives of the UN was to uphold this exact mentality by ‘uniting our strength’ in the ‘common interest’ for the ‘advancement of all peoples’ (UN, 1945), a clear parallel of cosmopolitan rhetoric and ideals.

Although it may not be obvious in practice, the ideology of the UN is based on the essentials of a cosmopolitan society in which by combining the powers of every state to uphold international norms as a pursuit to achieve a ‘just civil constitution’ (Kant, pg. 20, 2010).

Economic liberalisation in trade: The case of Ghana and the Cocoa industry

Economic liberalisation in regard to trade and domestic industries is becoming a popular trend in the global political and economic arena. Through institutions of global governance such as the World Trade Organisation and the International Monetary Fund, many developed countries are politically and economically stable enough to restrict governmental regulations and implement more liberal market reforms in order to increase their foreign investment and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However there has been much debate regarding these kinds of reforms being placed upon developing states, which are not yet economically or politically stable enough for their economies to thrive under these conditions. In these cases, Stiglitz contends that ‘It has become increasingly clear that financial and capital market liberalization done hurriedly, without first putting into place an effective regulatory framework was at the core of the problem’ (Stiglitz, pg.1075, 2000). Supporting this statement, this paper will argue that rather than fully liberalising a developing state’s economy and/or implementing a free market system, a state-regulated market system or ‘partial liberalisation’, is more beneficial for a developing state. This is exemplified in Ghana’s cocoa industry, where liberalisation has occurred on smaller scale, but not on an international scale, where it may be easier for a developing state to be exploited and threatened by more stable states. It will also be explained how different aspects of economics and economic ideologies affect Ghana’s cocoa production, and how it can be improved by making sure regulation is effectively maintained.

The concept of liberalisation often holds positive connotations to individuals and society as a whole. Included in liberalisation is the idea of lessening the government’s control in order to let the market become more fluid and allowing the supply and the demand of the people to balance out the economy (Smith, 1776) and create a ‘vibrant, competitive private agricultural marketing sector, with direct state intervention only in cases of clear market failure’ (Hubbard & Smith, pg. 10, 1996). Milton and Rose Friedman argue that through government deregulation, privatisation and competition through self-interest and voluntary transactions, a free market ‘could coordinate the activity of millions of people, each seeking his own interest, in such a way as to make everyone better off.’ (Friedman & Friedman, 2003). On a global scale, liberalisation ensures more fluid flow of goods and services between states by implementing trade and agriculture reforms that aim to reduce barriers and tariffs between states. However in more developed states, businesses are more able to rely on government subsidies to support them, giving them a clear advantage, as opposed to developing states where there is no access to this kind of support and the reliance upon agriculture is far higher (Mutume, 1999).  In contrast to this, a state-regulated, only partially liberalized economy is one where the price signals are designated by the government (rather than determined purely by supply and demand), as well as welfare and regulation provided to allow fluidity of goods, while still managing the way business and trade can operate.  In developing economies, regulations can also protect vulnerabilities in financial crises, as well as monitor and regulate the activity of foreign investors (Oatley, 2012). Although some neoliberals argue that ‘economies can hardly be planned’ (Reed, 2008, pg. 1) and that globalisation’s forces are making us more interdependent, Oatley is more truthful to the developing world when he states that ‘no matter how “globalized” the world economy becomes, economic production will always be based in local communities’ (Oatley, pg. 180, 2012).

Marketing boards established in West Africa during and after the Second World War were at attempt at price stabilisation and trade regulation in a very insecure region at a very unsteady time. ‘The marketing boards managed the entire marketing process, buying cocoa directly from producers and selling it to traders and processors at a specified, guaranteed price at least for the whole cocoa season’ (Haque, pg.7, 2004). These boards were initially supported by both the World Bank and the IMF, however as economic liberalisation was on the rise, the IMF and World Bank deemed it essential that these boards were closed down, as there was evidence that the marketing boards were ineffective (Hubbard & Smith, 1996). Ghana’s government-operated cocoa marketing board opened in 1947 as Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB). However, Ghana’s independence in 1957 saw extreme political turmoil, liberalisation and exploitation of its cocoa industry, where not only did producer prices plummet to a low of 29%, but employment within the now corrupt private cocoa marketing sector was promoted for political means (Williams, 2009). It wasn’t until 1983 under the new leadership of Jerry Rawlings did Ghana’s economy and cocoa industry see massive structural reform which included freeing up resources, increasing producer prices, reducing the significant over employment in the government sector and the introduction of the new government institution of Cocoa Board (CocoBod). Unlike the prior neoliberal objective, ‘simply removing the state from marketing systems was not the solution’ (Cullinan, pg. 9, 1999). With farmer revenues now at 70%, as intended in the original CocoBod reform, it is clear that without the agency of the state to manage quality control and export prices, the previous neoliberal policies were ‘uniformly tarnished’ (Amoah, pg. 69, 1998).

Liberalising economies completely and having free market systems in developing states has failed them and often creates more loss and instability. Liberalisation is significantly damaging and exploitative to a developing economy through exploitation against stronger, already-established economies that are often largely subsidized. In the case of trade liberalisation, exemplified by the World Trade Organisations Doha Development Rounds in 2001, negotiations were made which required the developing world to reduce its trade barriers and tariffs in order to liberalise their markets to more foreign trade and investment and to “better integrate the more disadvantaged into the global economy” (IMF, 2011). However, often in these pressures from neoliberal organisations such as the WTO or the International Monetary Fund, there are no labour protection safeguards implemented in participating states, meaning there is possibility for exploitation, as well as stronger states (who in 2001 refused to relinquish their own subsidies) leading the negotiations and leaving developing states with no voice. In developing states where social welfare and protection are scarce, it is crucial that ‘governments must craft consistent global financial regulations to prevent a race to the bottom, where capital leaks out to the areas of the global economy with the weakest regulation’ (Rudd, pg. 75, 2010). Unfortunately it was calculated that after the eighth trade agreement in 1995 which aimed at reduced prices paid for imports by developing states, ‘the result was that some of the poorest countries in the world were actually made worse off’ (Stiglitz, 2003). The conditionality associated with such liberal policies far outweighs the benefits that the developing world receives.

The liberalisation that occurred post WWII was significantly detrimental to Ghana’s cocoa industry. The opening of trade barriers to international imports resulted in a tidal wave of new goods into Ghana, making the competition between domestic and international products particularly harsh, meaning producers are often selling less or at a lower price (Melamed, 2005). Although market liberalisation aims at ‘productive efficiency through an alignment of domestic prices with world prices and to give cocoa farmers improved prices…There was, in fact, some contradiction between the two goals since the increased production from liberalization would lower the world price, thereby lowering the price the cocoa farmer actually received’ (Haque, pg. 8, 2004). Without state support, Ghanaian farmers do not have access to capital or technology in order to improve productivity or quality. This internal liberalisation also included the introduction of private Licensed Buying Companies (LBC) that can in fact compete for producer’s business. The concentration of cocoa production in Ghana is less prominent in rural areas; therefore these buying companies tend to cluster in more concentrated production areas, leaving rural producers with longer waiting periods until their cocoa is taken to quality control and exporters.  On top of this, other developed states are heavily subsidized, such as farms in the United States receiving $256 billion in 2013 (EWG, 2013), leading to an extremely unfair and unequal market (Melamed, 2005). Additionally, soft commodities such as Cocoa require constant attention to the production and quality control process (Williams, 2009). This indicates that without state-regulated quality control and pricing, cocoa producers and farmers are can receive less based on the lack of appropriate pricing dependent on its geographical origin (Fold, 2001) and that ‘private actors can exploit an origin’s reputation by marketing sub-par product for the premium quality price’ (Williams, 2009). These liberal ideologies and policies altogether assume that creating a competitive market will add incentive for greater productivity and efficiency, and ignore the consequences and circumstances of differing markets (Stiglitz, 2000).

Ghana’s state-regulated market system in its cocoa production has led it to be one of the fastest growing economies, and the world’s third-largest cocoa producer (Haque, 2004). In Ghana, where cocoa exports can make up to 30% of total earnings (Haque, 2004) and employ up to 60% of its population (Williams, 2009), it is important not to fully liberalise its economy, as it is the only cocoa-producing country that has not done so (Anang, Adusei and Mintah, 2011). CocoBod’s role in plant breeding, price determination, quality control, market intelligence and extension services are crucial to Ghana’s cocoa industry growth. For example, in other countries, cocoa can be produced at 1800kg per hectare in Malaysia and 800kg per hectare in Cote D’Ivoire. However, in Ghana, land where cocoa is produced on smaller land mass and production can be as little 360kg per hectare, it is obvious that increased land size would improve productivity of cocoa though, due to cocoa farmers do not have capital to purchase such land, as well as there not being enough forest land for them to purchase. Therefore, the analysis shows that increased use of fertilizer and insecticides helps to ensure maximum capacity of premium quality beans, and so the government has introduced “spraying gangs”- government-sponsored employees that come and spray land where cocoa is being produced, at no cost to the farmer (Aneani, Anchirinah, Asamoah & Owusu-Ansah, 2011). On a higher level, it is also important for CocoBod to ensure that export prices are predetermined, ensured for the whole cocoa season, and not vulnerable to the harsh competition of the global trading arena. It is in the government’s interest to ensure and maintain these aspects of production, for example in origin and quality, origin plays a large role to the global cocoa industry (as facilitated by Cadbury), and therefore origin and quality must be properly regulated in order to receive the premium price. These kinds of certifications through government regulation can help to make sure that producers stay high on the value chain and receive optimum producer price and equity, as is the aim of protectionism and partial liberalisation. It is therefore imperative that on the global economic agenda, governments work ‘to negotiate international rules defining the respective rights and obligations’ of each states needs (Oatley, 2012).

Stiglitz asserts that ‘the international economic architecture must be designed to “work” not just in the presence of perfect economic management, but with the kind of fallible governments and public officials that in fact occur in democratic societies’ (Stiglitz, pg. 1075, 2000). Market liberalism not only reduces this kind of positive government influence, but forces developing states’ highly-relied upon industries into a whirlpool of global vulnerabilities. Ghana is a prime example of the benefits of a government-regulated market in a single industry and that although the CocoBod’s initiatives are not yet uniform to all farmers, the price appreciation and benefits from the government’s moderation far prevail over the negative pressures of market liberalisation.


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