The Preventing Violent Extremism Policy – ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’

The persistence of global terrorism and violent extremism presents an ongoing threat to human security and national security. This threat, with the right policy response can be effectively mitigated or reduced. The Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) policy was developed in response to ongoing threats of home-grown terrorism, or risk of potential individuals in Australia becoming violent or extremist. This research utilises Carol Bacchi’s ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ (2009) framework to analyse the representation of the issue, the underlying assumptions that have shaped the issue, how it came to be, and the resulting effects of the PVE. This analysis focuses on the assumption that the community is both where the problem arises due to a lack of social cohesion, and therefore where the solution is assumed to be.

 

 What’s the ‘problem’ represented to be?

The Australian policy for preventing violent extremism and radicalization (PVE) portrays an issue surrounding a breakdown of social cohesion through diminishment of Australian values (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015, pg. 3). Although violent extremism is a global issue, the Australia government constructs a certain representation of the problem based on the way the issue is thought about and the surrounding values (Bacchi, 2009). The issue focused on within the policy is the evolution of violent extremism within Australian communities, however the problem represented (Bacchi, 2009) is that it is the responsibility of the entire Australian community to strengthen the community in order to prevent marginalisation, and to mobilize themselves to become more aware of potential individuals that may become violent extremists. The first paragraph of the PVE) specifically describes accepting diversity and promoting social cohesion as a challenge (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015, pg. 3). This is further highlighted by the inclusion of case studies of certain individuals or members of the community. These case studies attempt to highlight the fact that the lack of social cohesion and disengagement from the community can lead to acts of radicalisation (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015, pg. 5, pg. 11). Furthermore, the policy takes an educational stance and to address the contextual circumstances from which violent extremism can evolve and how the Australian community can identify these circumstances or signs of potential extremist behaviour and prevent their evolution (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015). These contexts are community-focused and claim that Australian society can lead to being more vulnerable and inclined to participate in violent extremist behaviour.

 

 What assumptions underpin this/these representation/s of the ‘problem’?

Within the many assumptions surrounding the PVE policy, there are two that stand out to be the key drivers in the policy as a response. The first lies around the rise of extremism being dependent on the surrounding social cohesion. This assumes that acceptance of diversity and social cohesiveness will not give rise to any potentially violent radical individuals. The PVE describes diversity to be an Australian value, and that we need to be inclusive of this diversity in order to prevent violent extremism. In addition to this, there is a binary assumed that is one of a coherent community versus the individuals detached from the community body. From this, the language of describing the community as a whole group compared with the language of the individual, presents the stronger, more resilient and privileged side of the binary to be the community. This demonstrates the high value placed on the community both as the problem and the solution to the issue.

The other assumption underlying the policy is that the community is the mechanism for fixing the problem and that it is in the best position to take action against the problem, not the government, which is parallel to a neoliberal ideology (Cahill, 2010) and a communitarian approach that pushes for the communal responsibility of community members in addressing social and political issues (Mclelland, 2006). By using education as the policy tool, it is showing that through educating the community, it is empowering people to be able to manage radical individuals. This idea that educating or telling people what to do is right, stems from the strict father model of ideology (Lakeoff, 2004) in that based on the correct set of values, the community should do whatever the father says. Anne Aly argues that policy responses such as the PVE rest on the false assumption that individuals or communities are more vulnerable to violence and extremism because they are politically and socially marginalized. The PVE tries to address these issues of resilience and social harmonization, however other root causes of extremism need to be explored. The problem is represented to be one of violent extremism developing from within the community. The community, or individuals within the community, are the source of the anxiety and therefore the problem, and in the case of the PVE, the community is also the source of the solution.

 

How have this/these representation/s of the ‘problem’ come about?

Carol Bacchi (2009) highlights the importance of being able to identify certain key events or decisions in history that have had an impact on the policy development today. Australia’s policy development regarding terrorism has been closely aligned with that of the United States (U.S). Since the 2001 9/11 World Trade Centre attacks in the U.S, the U.S government developed a policy plan titled the War on Terror, aimed at mobilising the world to combat global terrorism. Australia’s close relationship with the U.S could be reason for terrorism being high on Australia’s foreign policy agenda, as per Maddison and Denniss’ analysis (2013). Traditionally, issues of linking terrorism and ethnic diversity have been quite aggressive and portrayed to be a patriotic issue (Chopra, 2015). The PVE represents a shift in this conservative thinking to an issue not of specifically religious clash, but one of social cohesion in general. Anne Aly described the War on Terror to be a perpetual state of awareness and mobilisation. The PVE represents a shift in frame from the government as the ‘fixer’ of the problem, to the community members becoming mobilised and claiming them to be in the best position to be the ‘fixer’ (Aly, 2014). The PVE policy is an extension of this mobilisation; urging people in the community to be aware of potential individuals in their community that could become violent extremists.

The PVE’s focus on the community and the preservation of Australian values illustrate that ‘social cohesion’, ‘harmonisation’ (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015, pg. 3, 10) and traditional Australian values are of peak priority, hence the development of the PVE policy. The notion of social cohesion is ambiguous and ill-defined, however traces could be made back to the shift in approach made by the United Kingdom and broader Europe after the 2005 London bombings and the 2001 9/11 attacks in the United States, prompting an evolutionary shift in policy response (Harris-Hogan, Barelle & Zammit, 2016).

 

Power – influences and silences

The research informing the PVE policy was conducted by the Global Terrorism and Research Centre at Monash University in Victoria. With the focus of the policy being on education and providing education to the community to be able to respond to the problem, it is fitting that the information and research informing the policy was carried out by a prominent, influential education institution. However, the inclusion of certain information, statistics and anecdotal case studies is central to the political agenda, and was incorporated due the alignment with the political values and ideology of the current government. For example, the current Australian government carries a neoliberal communitarian ideology which places high value on the collective responsibility of the community in addressing certain issues (Mclelland, 2006). The PVE frames the issue in the same way (Lakoff, 2004). Framing the issue to be a problem related to the community evokes a sense of responsibility and mobilisation in the community members and puts the policy solution in the hands of them.

The case studies included in the PVE (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015, pp. 5, 11, 14, 19) present an array of members of the community from various parts of socio-economy. These community members that have encountered extremism highlight the representation of the policy; that it could happen to any member of the community, regardless of ethnicity or religion, and it arose due to a lack of engagement with their families and communities. These cases crystallised and dominated the problem representation and assumption; that a lack of community engagement and social cohesion is the cause of these people become violent and extreme.

There were a number of community members that were consulted as a part of the PVE development. A quote from Emeritus Professor Gary Bouma from Monash University (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015, pp. 5), a credible member of the educational and religious sector, is included. His view also concludes that violent extremism stems from feeling cut off from the larger community (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015 pp. 5). He also states that prevention is largely at the hands of the entire community. This view aligns with and further reinforces the PVE’s problem representation which is why it was included. The fact that he is the only prominent religious community member that is consulted only highlights those that were silenced. By representing the problem as one of social cohesion, and then not including consultations from diverse members of society truly shows whose opinion is more valued. By restricting the scope of consultation when formulating a policy, the scope of the policy options for outcome are automatically narrowed also (Curtain, 2006). Many members of the community such as Samier Dandan (2015) expressed their agitation with not being consulted in light of the PVE policy release and claim that it is ‘marked by a dismissal of research and recommendations from the Muslim Community’ (Dandan, 2015).

Silencing or lack of consultation represents a restriction on the way that we can think about the policy (Bacchi, 2009). One of the groups left unconsulted were the teachers and schools that were to be trained to identify signs of radicalisation (Nadim, 2016). This alternative account shows us the way the policy representation has limited our thinking about the policy, but also how the policy representation is inadequate in representing all views.  In addition to these views being ignored, we can look at the German de-radicalisation model ‘Hayat’ (Hayat Germany, 2011), which offers counselling services to those that are becoming radicalised. This problem representation offers a mental health account and considers radicalisation to be an issue of mental health and that those affected need help. In the PVE there is no mention of mental health being a factor that could lead to radicalisation, although Gary Bouma (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015, pp.5) discusses disengagement and feelings of not being cared about, which suggests a person may be experiencing poor mental health. Comparing these contexts suggests that there are cultural or political influences that have led to the Australian government thinking about extremism in this way. This could simply be influenced by Australia’s foreign relations with Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States, who initially led the focus-shift to more passive approaches that focused on cohesion and harmony (Harris-Hogan, Barelle & Zammit, 2016).

 

What are the effects?

The language of the PVE puts forward a specific way of thinking about the problem and discusses only part of the potential solution. ‘A breakdown in social cohesion can lead to a breakdown in community resilience’ (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015, pp. 3). This statement immediately puts forward that the only way to think about this issue is through the frame of social cohesion (Lakoff, 2014). The language throughout the policy evokes a sense of responsibility in the reader; ‘once someone is involved in violent extremism, it is important to help them leave or disengage from violent influences as soon as possible’ (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015, pp. 17). This discursive effect places responsibility of the community member to act as the first point of response and to act immediately. Most importantly, this sort of discourse persuades the reader be aware, mobilise themselves, and to respond in a specific way to the issue.

Policy making has the effect to divide groups that then become subjects of a particular policy and places those subjects within them (Bacchi, 2009). These dividing practices make the targeted group responsible for the problem. An example of a subjectified group within the PVE policy is the role of the educators or teachers, which under this policy are being trained to notice signs of extremism (Nadim, 2016). This shifts the context of school as a safe educational institute, to one of law enforcement and surveillance. In addition to schools and teachers being subjected to this kind of responsibility, the young Muslim community is now subjected to significant scrutiny in another aspect of the community. The creation of the binary community and the individual is somewhat hopeful in that it represents the community to be a lot bigger than the potential individual which would overpower the potentially extremist individual. These subjectification effects again reiterate the PVE’s assumption that the problem and therefore power and solution lies within the community to combat radicalisation.

Although the PVE is still in early stages, speculation can be made about what sort of lived effects will become of the assumptions and problem representation of the PVE. Bacchi (2009) argues that every problem representation impacts groups unevenly. This can be observed in looking the effects one each stakeholder. For instance, the overarching lived effect of the PVE is that the entire Australian community is now a body of securitisation and law enforcement. This is because the PVE has been formulated on an assumption that claims that the problem is within the community and a lack of cohesion within the community is the cause of the problem. If the problem is within the community, then so must be the response. This could lead to community members such as teachers or community leaders feeling a sense of guilt if they do not act within accordance. If blame is being placed onto the community and they are not acting, the blame perpetuates. For the children in the community, their school is no longer a beacon of safety and free of judgement, but a setting of scrutiny and insecurity.

The combination of discursive, subjectification and lived effects that are outlined highlight the way the issue has been represented in a very restrictive way in that all of these effects limit the possible problem identifications and outcomes. This is exemplified in the silencing and lack of consultation with groups that acknowledge the broader circumstances and causes of radicalisation. This knowledge has been ‘excluded’ as has other ‘widely accepted research from the discussions about how to tackle radicalisation’ (Dandan, 2015). Furthermore, as Dandan states, by securitising the community we are automatically ignoring the broader socio-political issues that contribute to radicalisation (Dandan, 2015). These effects are also creating a sense of insecurity in community members by placing full responsibility onto the community, the ‘lack of leadership at the national level is affecting how safe Victorian multicultural communities feel ‘on the ground’ (ECCV, 2015, pp. 2).

Through analysis using Bacchi’s (2009) framework, the effectiveness of the PVE in addressing the violent extremism appropriately, is limited. Measures of policy effectiveness depends on judgements of value and critique (McConnell, 2010). Concerns on its effectiveness were promptly articulated by members of the community who had been subjectified as a result of the PVE policy. A main concern was issues of funding and its efficacy in addressing surrounding issues of extremism such as systematic racism, cultural differences, Western assimilation and mental health. Many groups claimed that they had not seen any result in the supposed increase in funding (Bachelard, 2015) and that the program was counter-productive in that ‘those advising the government on the development of such policies are also those who will receive millions of dollars in grants to run these programs’ (Nadim, 2016). The term social cohesion is ambiguous and confusing, and often can be interchanged with issues around assimilation into other societies, as expressed by the EVVC (2015). The attribution of responsibility onto the community does not appropriately reflect who or what is to blame for violent extremism. In addition to this, extremism, cohesion, community and other vague terms add to the limitation of the PVE policy to be definitive, focused and produce tangible programs and outcomes (Harris-Hogan, Barelle & Zammit, 2016).

The experiences of the community after the development of the PVE as a response to violent extremism will be severely dichotomised. By resting on assumptions that the problem lies within the community as a result of lack of social cohesion is narrow and tries to ignore the broader social, economic, political and global issues that are the true causes and factors contributing to violent extremism in Australia. This analysis found that by placing full responsibility on the community to mobilise themselves is ineffective and only creates an insecure environment where people are feel unsafe and more polarised than ever. This is ironic and counter-productive considering the overall pursuit of social cohesion and harmony as a preventative to violent extremism, ambiguous as those concepts are. ‘The problem of Muslim radicalisation needs to be put into perspective, reduced not abetted, and addressed honestly and sincerely with a resolution not expediency in mind.’ (Rane, 2015). This is where a more comprehensive and inclusive approach needs to be developed that appropriately engages with and acknowledges all social, political and cultural issues.

 

 

References

Aly, A. (2014) ‘Countering violent extremism: Social harmony, community resilience and the potential of counter- narratives in the Australian context’, in Baker-Beall, C., Heath-Kelly, C., Jarvis, L., (2014), Counter-Radicalisation: Critical perspectives, Taylor and Francis, Florence

Attorney-General’s Department (2015), Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation in Australia, Commonwealth of Australia

Bacchi, C. (2009) Analysing Policy: What’s the problem represented to be? Pearson Australia, Frenchs Forest Chapter 1 Introducing a ‘what’s the problem represented to be?’ approach to policy analysis

Bachelard, M. (2015), Muslim Community still waiting for Abbott Government’s Anti-Terror Funds, The Age, Australia, http://www.theage.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/muslim-community-still-waiting-for-abbott-governments-antiterror-funds-20150422-1mqzzx.html (accessed 25/05/16)

Cahill, D (2010) ‘Actually existing neoliberalism’ and the global economic crisis, Labour & Industry, Vol. 20, No. 3, Dec 2010: 298-316

ECCV (2015), Are We Really Living Safe Together? – Part 2 Report of Ethnic Communities Council of Victoria’s Roundtable Discussion on government spending on community-based ‘deradicalisation’ programs held on 24 July 2015, Ethnic Communities’ Council of Victoria Policy Brief 3

Lakoff, G (2004) Don’t Think of an Elephant: know your values and frame the debate, Scribe, Melbourne Chapter 1 Framing 101: How to take back public discourse

Maddison, S & Denniss, R (2013) Chapter 6: Identifying Issues: Agenda Setting and Policy Discourses, in An Introduction to Australian Public Policy; theory and practice, 2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne

Cahill, D (2010) ‘Actually existing neoliberalism’ and the global economic crisis [online] Labour & Industry, Vol. 20, No. 3, Dec 2010: 298-316

Chopra, T. (2015), Beyond Burqas, Bombs, and Bogeymen: Australian Muslims and the Media, Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity, 3(2)

Curtain, R (2006) ‘Engaging citizens to solve major public policy challenges’ in Colebatch, H. (ed) Beyond the Policy Cycle: the policy process in Australia, Allen & Unwin

Dandan, S. (2015), The Government’s Failing Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Lebanese Muslim Association

Harris-Hogan, S., Barrelle, K., & Zammit, A. (2016), What is countering violent extremism? Exploring CVE policy and practice in Australia, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 8(1), 6-24

Hayat-Germany (2011), Deradicalisation Network, German Federal Office for Immigration and Refugee Affairs

McClelland, A ‘Values, Concepts and Social Policy Design’ in McClelland, A &

McConnell, A (2010) Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas In-Between, Journal of Public Policy, 2010, Vol.30(3), pp.345-362

Nadim, H. (2016), Schools not the place for deradicalisation programs, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy

Rane, H. (2015), Muslim Radicalisation: where does the responsibility rest?, ABC Religion and Ethics, ABC, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2015/10/13/4330670.htm (accessed 21/05/16)

Smyth, P (eds) (2006), Social Policy in Australia, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne

Reflections on the Social Construction of Mental Health

I find the discussion of the scientific field and discourse about mental health really interesting, and how often certain specialists can really play off one another. I’ve certainly experienced this after being diagnosed with depression at 14, and generalised anxiety disorder at 16. One of my specialists once asked me whether I thought that my illnesses was me or whether it was an external thing that happened to be occupying my brain that could be deterred. My other specialist simultaneously had been telling me that this was clearly always going to be an issue in my life, it was always going to be present and I was never going to fully recover. Being a teenager, I wasn’t quite sure what was me in my head or what was something else, but I remember earlier, at 9 years old and distinctly knowing that something was wrong with me. At 17 I was still in that headspace as well but it had progressed and I was unsure if it was me or another entity but I did think it was somewhat both. I think this was part of me trying to resist the diagnosis and the idea that it was my problematic brain, but also me performing the diagnosis that I had been given. As we discussed in class, I find it interesting how some people try so hard to resist a diagnosis because they don’t want it to become their identity, and how some people really embrace it, often to their detriment and the illnesses manifestation. I feel like I sort of accepted and embraced it simply because I was exhausted of trying to figure what I was feeling and why I felt that way. This highlights the importance of language, labels and validation as a way of me understanding my emotions and myself after so long. In a way the diagnosis validated my mentality and the way I behaved. Because I was young, I sometimes used this as an excuse, however as I got older I realised, and after thinking about my two contradictory specialists, that no I may not fully recover, and yes I felt that my feelings were out of my control, but I soon learned to mature a lot and change my behaviour so that it didn’t reflect my true feelings and didn’t affect my relationships. Well, I tried my best, and to be fair I think I’ve come a long way and have matured drastically and can now really safely evaluate my feelings and thoughts and understand them more.

 

A study by Williams and Collins (2002) really struck a chord in that it discussed the idea of chronicity and how characteristics of disadvantage are associated with being chronically ill. I think this really reflects what our society values as healthy and chronic (ahem, capitalism and the workforce) and the idea that societal beliefs about mental illness perpetuate disadvantage that might come with it, for example employment and relationships, this again attaches stigma and reveals societal judgements about it. These constructs contribute to both the stigma attached to mental illness in general, but also to the fact that not much attention is placed on ‘high-functioning’ mentally ill people (such as depression, anxiety and bipolar), as if it doesn’t really matter because they’re participating in society in a way that’s acceptable, therefore it can’t be that bad – this is one thing I hate about mental health discourse. My other thoughts when reading this reading was the idea of diagnosis and scientific rhetoric used to incapacitate (or clinic-ise, as some put it) someone. This sort of classification is problematic to me as I feel like it’s so important to validate someone’s feelings when they’re mentally unwell but at the same time it perpetuates a sort of hypochondria and/or othering. I definitely experienced this when I was young, being taken out of class all the time, my teachers would tell other students (the fact that I was unwell), my teachers would take my friends away from class to give them counselling on how to respond to and support me. It was very isolating. It also perpetuated this part of me that was so self-loathing that I became obnoxious and narcissistic, really making people dislike me more and isolating me further. It makes me think about others who look for validation in their mental illness, I saw it a lot in high school and as I was learning it about myself, it really frustrated me when I saw other people look for that attention and justification for nothing but their behaviour. Reading the Williams and Collins study, where they discuss chronicity, it made me think about people that seek validation through diagnosis may somewhat perpetuate their mentality as well, in the same way that an editorial by Eisenberg (1988) discusses science as looking for confirmation as a way to explain certain interactions or make sense of chaos. This sort of scientific rhetoric and validation (of observation and prediction) reminded me of my past philosophy studies, looking into Karl Popper and David Hume where they challenge traditional scientific paradigms. Popper claims that confirmation/validation (of theory, in science) is easy to look for, similar to the way that confirmation through diagnosis is easy to look for. I wonder whether we should think about changing that and adopting his falsification theory whereby everything should be able to be disproved in order to progress toward truth. This means we’d be looking for disproof in a theory or mental health, to be able to establish diagnosis (or lack of). It sounds confusing at the moment but when it instantly came to my mind it made total sense. The way we look at mental health now relies on the uniformity of mentality, in the same way that Hume says science relies on the uniformity of nature. This sort of thinking is where mental illness comes from – who determines what is normal? And why are they looking for reasons or confirmation of people not being ‘normal’ in regard to mental health/illness?

If anyone understands the severity of mental health and the importance of breaking stigma and encouraging discussion and support, it’s me. However, I am a constructionist, and I have always wondered where the threshold lies…

At what point do our thoughts become abnormal?

At what point are they unhealthy?

Is acknowledging their abnormality or existence a warrant for them to exist?

At what point have we recovered?

Dealing with Diplomacy

The P5+1, that is the 5 most powerful states in the United Nations (UN) (France, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) plus Germany, have proposed multilateral diplomatic negotiations with Iran in regard to its nuclear regime. However, the United States Republican Party (GOP) disagree with diplomatic efforts and plan to sabotage the negotiations through blocking the proposal once it reaches the US Senate, and propose that strike attacks against Iran are a safer option than a nuclear-armed Iran (Kroenig, 2012). These diplomatic compromises may improve not only US and Iran relations, but Iran’s relations with the Western world as rather than its economy being sabotaged, an attempt at recuperation and peace-building could lead to a less nuclear-capable and less aggressive Iran, making room for peace-building in the Middle East.

Commencing initially in November 2013, the P5+1 negotiations essentially outline that Iran will be relieved of various international sanctions against it (within UN resolutions and otherwise) so long as Iran commits to a reduction in its nuclear production.  If the final settlement concludes in June 2015 as proposed, Iran will have pledge to diluting certain nuclear elements, limiting centrifuge connection and production, and freezing production of important elements in its stockpile, and abiding by non-proliferation guidelines, as outlined by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the IAEA guidelines (Garcia, Katzman, Kerr, Nikitin, 2015). However, the GOP immediately and overtly rejected US President Barack Obama’s proposal to sign the deal on the basis that Obama ‘is more interested in signing a deal—any deal—with Iran regardless of the deal’s effectiveness in stopping Iran from ever building a nuclear weapon.’ And that the deal will be a bad one that will ultimately allow Iran to continue its nuclear program and ultimately develop a nuclear weapon. (Cotton, 2015).Statements from GOP members and senators are in response to an open letter written and sent to the leaders of Iran that largely stated the pointlessness of agreeing to the P5+1 negotiations, as when Obama’s presidential term ends, legislation says that any US president maintains right to veto any previous binding deal and that Obama must have a two-third Senate majority to pass the bill initially anyway, which would not occur in the GOP-led Senate (United States Senate, 2015). Dramatically opposed to allowing Iran to continue (albeit at a far less progressive rate), GOP senators are plotting to sabotage any attempt at passing the bill, highlighting the deep vendetta held against Iran, as further articulated by Senator John Isakson, who would like to pursue further compensation from Iran for American diplomats taken more than 30 years ago (Broder, 2015). Other suggested alternatives, including Marco Rubio’s proposition whereby Iran must formally recognise Israel (an undoubted rejection) have all been termed ‘poison pill’s’ (Broder, 2015). These suggested alternatives, although some seeming diplomatic and based on negotiation, still fuel the aggression and hostility held towards Iran which will undoubtedly drive motivation to boost its nuclear programme, rather than at least try to slow it down and allow concessions.

The possibility of achieving complete non-proliferation is slim, especially considering that the P5 are all states that are officially recognised as possessing nuclear weapons (Arms Control Association, 2015). Furthermore, in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states that member states must ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament’ (Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968) rather than suggesting a full-blown missile strike against Iran, as Michael Kroenig proposes (Kroenig, 2012). Although Iran have not upheld the best reputation during its weaponised history (Landau & Stein, 2014), as Stephen Walt suggests, it is important to not simply try and find the ultimate solution, but to evaluate a series of responses and narrow it down to which approach carries the least amount of risk (Walt, 2011). Through the lens of conscious realism (Hoffman, 2008) on the political stage, it is clear to see that in regard to dichotomy of war versus diplomacy and negotiation, the objective reality is that diplomacy and negotiation are evidently superior to war and violence as a means of consensual and legitimate dispute settlement mechanisms. Iran insists that there is ‘no credible deterrence’ (JTA, 2014) to stop Iran’s nuclear programme, rather than presenting a threatening stance led by the somewhat exceptional U.S, the U.S’s idea to “lead from behind” (Indyk M. S., Lieberthal K. G. & Hanlon M. E. 2012) is a far more diplomatic effort from the P5+1 than to cease all negotiations, which could ‘increase the possibility that Iran would accelerate its nuclear program and that the United States or Israel would launch military strikes. The last thing we need is yet another war in the Middle East.’ (Collina, 2014).

With Iran being labelled as a sponsor of state terrorism and maintaining a hardliner posture, it is clear that remaining antagonistic when weaponry is involved, things will not only not move forward, but they will get more hostile. The GOP is stuck in a more aggressive era and needs to move towards a more calm and cautious stance to solve issues in a more covert manner through slow development rather than outright refusal.  The circumstances and proposals around Iran’s nuclear program are not ideal, however the P5+1 proposal is less damaging and is more sustainable and productive than one-way non-proliferation deals or blatant strike attacks. It also must be remembered that no one can see into the future and confidently articulate what the consequences of each manoeuvre will be.

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Collective Security or Collective Defence? The Importance of Lexicology in Policy

Going against Article 9 of their Constitution (1947), the Japanese government has bilaterally decided with the United States (US) to amend its defence and security strategy in order to improve alliance efficiency. This strategic security tactic fundamentally alters Japan’s stance towards warfare and presents a more aggressive political posture. Discourse surrounding the development includes both terms of collective security and collective self-defence; differing concepts that are being treated as synonymous (Martin, 2015). Under international law, concepts of collective security and collective self-defence have distinct conditions which therefore have severe implications and consequences. The consequences of these new negotiations and cooperation can be seen on a broad scale in terms of US, China and Japan relations, but also more closely on a technical and syntactical level.

Opposing article 9 of the Japanese 1947 constitution which declared ‘the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes’ (Japanese Constitution, art. 9, 1947), The post-World War II period saw Japan’s 1952 US-Japan Security Treaty to be under pressure from both socialists, conservatives and even from the US. During May of 1960, Japanese conservatives sought a more balanced defence strategy that not only rearmed Japan, but allowed mutual defence between the US and Japan, and also granted Japan with more control over US forces (AFE, 2009). New negotiations on the original treaty committed the US to defend Japan if under attack but only at the permission or consultation of the Japanese. Despite continued Japanese insistence that US military presence in Japan was and still is essential for the protection of Japan, the motives of a post-war US which included incorporating old enemy states and rebalancing rising powers shone a new light on the beneficiaries of the new negotiations. This transition never really disappeared as in 2010 the Obama administration announced a new pivot towards Asia as it moved into ‘strengthening alliances’ and ‘deepening partnerships with emerging powers’ such as Japan, according to former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon (Donilon, 2013). This continuously strengthening alliance with Japan, including support for the administrative control of the Senkaku Islands, as affirmed by Hillary Clinton in 2010 and reaffirmed by President Barack Obama on the basis of article 5 of the new bilateral defence treaty (Obama, 2015). Supporting Japan on this issue could be detrimental to US-China relations, with which the US is also attempting to strengthen ties and renew alliance. How the US will improve ties with China while supporting Japan in its strive for South Sea Islands may be damaging to US relations with China, potentially causing more contingencies between China, the US and Japan itself.

The technicalities and rhetoric surrounding in the defence guidelines purposely make ambiguous the terms of which Japan and the US can come to each other’s defence and protection. Considering the guidelines have not yet been voted on or finalised, the implications are currently based on surrounding discourse which employs both the terms collective self-defence and collective security (Martin, 2015). It is dangerous to think that both these terms could be used in the final guideline proposal as these terms collective self-defence and collective security are not synonymous. [Collective] Self-defence is justified under article 51 of the United Nations (UN) charter, therefore almost any attack that Japan may pursue could essentially rely upon the [collective] self-defence ruling (United Nations Charter, 1945). Collective security is a much broader scope and is rationalised under article 42 of the UN charter as necessary (at UN discretion) if there is threat to international security and order (United Nations Charter, 1945). If in the new defence guidelines, both terms collective self-defence and collective security were to be used, it essentially justifies any armed attack Japan takes against anyone on the basis that they too had pursued an attack. Given that the guidelines were negotiated in conjunction with the US, it would indeed permit Japan to engage in any use of force that is initiated by the US, without necessary permission or authorization from the UN. The Japanese government has tried to give very specific examples of what these conditions would permit them to such as ballistic missiles being launched at the US. However other ambiguous language such as ‘international peace cooperation activities’ (Martin, 2015) tend to blur the real guidelines and conditions for the agreement. It must be made clear the correct usage of terms collective self-defence and collective security and which is used in the final guidelines as each have their own severe implications and consequences not only for the US-Japan alliance, but for the entire global political stage.

Although the new defence guidelines are an attempt at not only strengthening US-Japan ties, tightening Japan’s defence and acquiring a more efficient response to contingencies, it seems that the implications of said guidelines have other agendas. The US’s interest in embracing its relations with Japan seems to act as a forefront for a US geo-strategic position in the Asian region, in accordance with its bold pivot towards Asia. It is crucial that the technicalities and rhetoric surrounding the negotiations are clearly defined and separated so as not to blur the conditions in order to find loopholes for the benefit of the US or Japan’s foreign relations and policy instruments.

AFE (2009) Article 9 and the US-Japan Security Treaty, ‘Asia for Educators’, Columbia University, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1950_usjapan.htm (accessed 15/5/2015)

Department of Defense (2015), Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, United States Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/20150427_–_GUIDELINES_FOR_US-JAPAN_DEFENSE_COOPERATION_FINAL&CLEAN.pdf (accessed 15/5/2015)

Donilon, T. (2013), The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013, The Asia Society, New York, NY

Japanese Government (1947), Article 9, the Constitution of Japan, https://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat/162d151af444ded44125673e00508141/cb8ffa8ef0951853c1256a7e002a9ee1/$FILE/Constitution%20-%20Japan%20-%20EN.pdf (accessed 15/5/2015)

Klingner, B. (2015), Amid Chinese Aggression, Obama Affirms U.S Defence of Japan’s Senkaku Islands, The Daily Signal, The Heritage Foundation, http://dailysignal.com/2014/04/24/amid-chinese-aggression-obama-affirms-u-s-defense-japans-senkaku-islands/ accessed 15/5/2015

Martin, C. (2015), Collective self-defense and collective security: what the differences mean for Japan, The Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2007/08/30/commentary/world-commentary/collective-self-defense-and-collective-security-what-the-differences-mean-for-japan/#.VVlZO_mqqko (accessed 15/5/2015)

United Nations (1945), Charter of the United Nations, VII 42, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf (accessed 15/5/2015)

United Nations (1945), Charter of the United Nations, VII 51, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf (accessed 15/5/2015)

American Exceptionalism as an Inherent Ingredient in U.S Foreign Policy

Realists argue that the United States (U.S) acts out of its own need for self-help and preservation in the nature of the competitive global political arena. However, as crystallised by the Bush administration, the notion of American Exceptionalism is a significant driving force in US foreign policy. Although realism may hold an undertone in US foreign policy, the entitled position that the U.S has constructed for itself has derived from the deeply rooted history and rhetoric surrounding religion, manifest destiny, responsibility and expansion that has now morphed into the belief of Exceptionalism. These manifestations of a common theme have been exemplified throughout U.S history, in particular the 20^th century, however this discussion intends to focus on the Bush administration and Doctrine that used Exceptionalism as a guide to action in foreign policy, the use of force, the War on Terror and its rhetoric and the all-embracing spread of American freedom and democracy.

American Exceptionalism is argued to be adapted from the complex relationship between the U.S constitution and the vast Christian population that it governed. The American independence and the creation of the Constitution was built on the political experiment that would ideally create the perfect republic in which the American population would be granted the ultimate liberties and individual rights (Encyclopaedia of the New American Nation). This was an attempt at a separation from the ‘Old World’ that was Europe to the New World Order; a democratic republic that strove to avoid the class conflicts and socialism of Eastern Europe at the time (Tyrrell, 1991). Inextricably linked with this idea of separation is the U.S’s responsibility to lead the rest of the world to this New World Order in the political realm; as if enlightening the rest of the world to the greater political good that is democracy (Ceasar, 2012). The term ‘exceptional’ implies unique; different; special in either holding a certain quality or in determination of a certain pursuit (Caesar, 2012). Contextually-speaking, the government and Constitution of the U.S as a new world nation was unique and thus ‘overtones of natural superiority’ (Tyrrell, 1991, pg. 1034) and leadership were realised. ‘At the heart of this difference is religion’ and ‘the durability of American religious beliefs’ (Galston, 2014). During the American Westward expansion period in the early 1800s, the concept of a Manifest Destiny as a part of God’s plan, America’s pursuit of fulfilment and “in essence the doctrine that one nation has a preeminent social worth, a distinctively lofty mission, and consequently, unique rights in the application of moral principles.” (Weinberg, 1935, pg. 8). The territorial expansion of the United States was essentially a sign that the spread of U.S freedom and democracy must spread all over the globe, and this was certainly continued through the centuries following the initial acquisition of the American continent. It is pursuits such as these that are consequences of the sacred association of exceptional U.S foreign policy. However, the term ‘Exceptionalism’ was not discussed until Alexis De Tocqueville in his ‘Democracy in America’ wrote that ‘The position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one’ (De Tocqueville, 1840, pg. 31). This was following on from Joseph Stalin’s ironic comment that the U.S was the exception in not having any presence of social classes or socialism (Friedman, 2012). During his presidency in 2001-2009, U.S President George Bush exemplified how the belief and now ideology of American Exceptionalism shaped U.S foreign policy through claimed responsibility, entitlement and leadership in spreading ‘the blessings of freedom and democracy with others around the world’ (Land, 2010).

When George W. Bush was inaugurated on January 20^th of 2001, he delivered a bold and promising inaugural speech ensuring that America’s ‘faith in freedom and democracy was a rock in a raging sea’ (Bush, 2001). Bush boldly declared that ‘If our country does not lead the cause of freedom, it will not be led’, a blatant appeal to the Exceptional position and responsibility to lead the world in the image of America; as if without America, freedom and progress would not occur. The presidential transfer to Bush was seen in in many eyes as a revolution, one that both threw off constraints from its allies and utilised its strength to progress and inspire the rest of the world (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). After the events of September 11 2001, four coordinated terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre Towers and the Pentagon, it was clear that U.S foreign policy and foreign policy discussions would be changed forever. The Bush Doctrine had now developed into notions of pre-emptive and preventative war, the War on Terror, the spread of democracy, exemptions from international law and norms so that ‘The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom.’ (Bush, 2001). This paradigm shift in foreign policy provided a more aggressive direction of action, laced with religious rhetoric exemplified in Bush’s ‘We are not this story’s author, who fills time and eternity with his purpose. Yet his purpose is achieved in our duty’. Such emphasis on U.S fulfilment and duty to lead the course of action seemed to provide God’s warrant for U.S unilateralism and practices in its foreign policy.  In Bush’s rhetoric lies distinct manifestations of the Exceptionalist position in terms of Bush’s feeling of being the exception to international law, the need to take the lead in the War on Terror, dismantling governing bodies in the Middle East so as to implement democracy, and creating false dichotomies of the U.S versus terrorism. These expeditions of unipolarity during the Bush administration were an exhibit of possible manifest destiny.

President George Bush and his approach to foreign policy was an evident illustration to American Exceptionalism and in particular, entitlement. When the Kyoto protocol was adopted and negotiations were being made under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in December 1997, tensions arose between negotiators, notably the European Union and the U.S regarding restrictions and targets for the reduction of Greenhouse Gases, of which the U.S emitted a total of 6503.8 million tonnes (Freeland, 2001). Shortly after his inauguration in 2001, George Bush, although ‘committed to a leadership role’ in climate change (The Economist, 2001), announced that the U.S would be withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol on the basis that it would be detrimental to the U.S economy, that scientific foundations were insufficient and agreements made by other major emitters such as China and India were not binding enough (Freeland, 2001). This contemporary example of the U.S feeling constrained by terms of the rest of the world, rather than terms of their own, is a perceived attempt at the European Old World trying to dominate the New (Cox & Stokes, 2012), not in a territorial sense, but in a political one, and from Bush’s perspective an economic one also. The U.S withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol at the leadership of George Bush is a particular case that pertains to American Exceptionalism and its characteristic of entitlement and leadership. While a withdrawal from a less-developed nation may not have been as consequential, considering US support was highly prioritised (Freeland, 2001), George Bush went on to claim that the Kyoto Protocol was essentially ‘dead’ (The Economist, 2001). Political discourse such as this assumes that without the U.S support, there is no state that is as successful or committed as the U.S, as if to say it would have no progress without U.S support. This is perhaps due to global environmental law and its terms differing because the consequences of one states non-compliance in a climate treaty is far more severe upon other states, rather than simply not having support (Chalecki, 2007). ‘This means that a one non-party nation can render the entire regime ineffective’ (Chalecki, 2007, pg. 15). As supported by Elizabeth Chalecki, George Bush’s decision to withdraw from the Kyoto protocol was a concrete example of aspects of Exceptionalism such as wanting to criticise other states, gaining exceptions or exemptions for U.S practises and most importantly avoidance or isolation from legal jurisdictions (Ignatieff, 2005).

After the wake of the September 11 attacks in 2001, George Bush declared that ‘America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world’ and that it was time to protect the ‘justice and peace’ that America supposedly stands for (Bush, 2001). It was during this speech that Bush referred to the pivotal turning point in U.S foreign policy as the ‘War on Terror’ or the ‘War on terrorism’ (Stokes, 2009). It was declared and frequently reinforced that ‘America has stood down enemies before, and will do so again this time’ and that ‘America will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts, and those who harbour them’ (Bush, 2001). It was this shift from political containment to an overt and aggressive ideology of anti-terrorism; as if creating and deterring terrorism provided a justification of U.S intervention and war (Stokes, 2009). These notions were put into legal action with the publishing of Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS) in September, 2002 which announced the validation for attack with the introduction of prevention and pre-emption (Freedman, 2006). During his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush declared that he would ‘not wait on events, while dangers gather’ (Bush, 2002). The NSS articulated links between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and states that had Weapons of Mass Destruction capacities and capabilities, and it was the ultimate objective of the NSS to achieve full military superiority to an exceptional point where no other threatening states would have means to reach the same military capacities as the U.S and therefore deter them from attacking again (Stokes, 2009). Eventually, it was realised that the Bush needed some form of foreign support and so the Coalition of the willing was formed as an appeared multilateral effort, obviously led by the U.S (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). President Bush felt that the U.S’s ‘responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil’ (Bush, 2001). Presenting the War on Terror in such a dichotomous way not only assumed the preventative and pre-emptive attacks were the only pathway to defeating terrorism, but also put the idea of a global concept such as terrorism, on the same level as a state, concluding that the U.S was in fact as powerful as terrorism and was going to be more so. The unipolarity disguised as the Coalition of the willing is a distinct illustration of the Bush administration’s claim to Exceptionalism. The abolishment of global terrorism was going to be Bush’s vision of America as the exceptional state whose pursuit of terrorism and global democracy needed to be fulfilled as its manifest destiny, and without U.S leadership in said pursuit, the world could not progress.

Following the announcement of the global War on Terror, the U.S intervention in Iraq in 2003 was an explicit demonstration of America’s supposed Exceptionalist position. Manifestations of American Exceptionalism including unconditional commitment and determination to a certain mission or pursuit (Ceaser, 2012), such as the War on Terror, meant that the U.S would stop at nothing ‘come hell or high water’ (Sloan, 2008, pg. 4) to fulfil their political, moral and religious obligation. The intervention was prompted by the belief that Iraq was harbouring both Saddam Hussien, who was at the time believed to be partially responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and harbouring and building weapons of mass destruction (WMD). By presenting the Iraq intervention as positively fighting terrorism and simultaneously promoting supposed freedom and democracy, the U.S’s right to intervene seemed almost unquestionable and President Bush believed that the intrusion was far too urgent for even the United Nations Security Council’s investigations of Iraq’s WMDs to be completed. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter articulates that an attack or intervention is only reasonable under pretences of proportionality and direct imminence of an attack or threat (United Nations Charter, 1945). However, the belief that Saddam Hussien was both building and harbouring WMDs was in fact incorrect, and the U.S’s involvement based on self-defence and pre-emption and prevention was now in fact a full-blown attack. One understanding of Exceptionalism is to believe that one is exempt from universal standards of morality or right and wrong (Bromwich, 2014). In the events surrounding the U.S intervention in Iraq it is simple to see that President Bush believed that America was in a position that was above moral and legal right and wrong in the standards of universally binding institutions such as the United Nations, as well as questioned its authority over U.S foreign policy (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). In addition to this, it is often difficult to justify a war or invasion to the public, therefore by presenting to the masses as if the war on terror as not only a false dichotomy, but also an appeal to the exceptional nature of American people, Bush was able to rationalise the War on Terror to the American public.

Following the intervention in Iraq, a view that is widely held is that the Bush administration held no exit strategy and that Bush and his closest advisors felt that it would be best leave just as quickly as they arrived with no reconstruction effort (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). However, in a quick thought transition, the Bush administration decided that part of the fight against terrorism would be to oust the current governing system and hold an election to implement a new leader and democratic government, based on the Democratic Peace Theory (Kant, 1795) and ‘undertake active measures to spread its universal political values and institutions’ (Harland, 2013, pg. 51). Robert Miller argues that there are three main components to the ideal of a Manifest Destiny: the special virtues of the American people and their institutions; America’s mission to redeem and remake the world in the image of America; and a divine destiny under God’s direction to accomplish this wonderful task’ (Miller, 2006, pg. 120). In January 2005 George Bush announced that after the first democratic elections held in Iraq that ‘the world is hearing the voice of freedom’ and that ‘By participating in free elections, the Iraqi people have firmly rejected the anti-democratic ideology of the terrorists’ (Alexander & Saadi, 2005). As Ceaser suggests, at some point in history the Exceptionalist idea of a mission somehow got skewed with ideals of American freedom and democracy (Ceaser, 2012) as a justification for democratisation around the world. Although allies expressed support for a war against terrorism, not necessarily all agreed on such pursuit and determination in disabling a government system and implementing American democratic policy; these were claimed expressions of concern for U.S hegemony (Warren, 2012). The revolutionary pursuit of a state and the rhetoric surrounding it exemplified the exceptional shift from a post-Cold War containment era to a foreign policy that made no distinction between states and terrorism and therefore felt that the only escape from terrorism was to implement the virtues of American liberty, in hope that such ‘a religiously inspired errand to promote liberty or liberal democracy in the world’ (Ceaser, 2012, pg. 8) would succeed in dogmatically promoting America’s image. Moreover, the sentiment that the U.S possesses in being separate from the Old World and being blessed with a religious and political mission to reform the world order (McDougall, 2012), was a direct driver in Bush’s decision to not only invade but restore a new political order in Iraq.

Since its first coining of the term, originally referring to the uniqueness of America’s conception, American Exceptionalism has been exaggerated as a guide to action in U.S foreign policy. The progress-oriented concept of a New World Order provided a political platform for the U.S, in particular the Bush administration to dramatically shift from a containment-based political posture to an overt, more aggressive and unipolar actions in regard to terrorism and asymmetrical warfare, deemed as the biggest threats to U.S security and leadership on the global political arena. Since the event of 9/11, President Bush’s foreign policy was dominated by discourse and decisions made to protect the exceptional liberties of the U.S, it is evident that the use of a supposed religious and therefore obligatory purpose as a foreign policy instrument was ambitiously adopted by the Bush administration, but was also ineffective as a idolatrous grand strategy of the Bush administration in attempt to reach a supposed unipolar moment in the name of American Exceptionalism.

The impossibilities of living in a society and achieving ultimate individual freedom

Individual freedom is not possible in a civil society as the coming together to create a society, and the means of protecting a society requires some restrictions of freedom itself.

In Immanuel Kant’s Ideas of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, he argues that it is impossible for man to achieve his full potential unless all the strength and power of mankind is combined to create a society (Kant, 2010). It is then that the realist, self-interested practices that aim to achieve power and wealth must be put aside for the interest and preservation of the common good (Kant, 2010). The idea of absolute individual freedom is consistently restrained by consequences and prior events, commonly known in the philosophy world as The Problem of Free Will. The concept of absolute individual freedom without constraint would require the abandonment of human reason influencing the individual’s behaviour. In a society where there are numerous influences such as the media, the environment and finance, avoiding all influences and abandoning human reason in order to attain individual liberty.

The dynamic sociological model of identity argues that the idea of self is socially constructed through discourse and context. The model by Stets and Burke also argues that the self is reflective of the society it is in and vice versa (Stets & Burke, 2003). The concept of a society is built upon the organisation of a community of people in a more or less ordered way. If the self is reflective of a society, then absolute individual freedom cannot exist or it would lead to a congregation of realist individuals exercising unconditional freedom and therefore not progressing toward the common good. This construct and structure supports that ‘man is born free but sacrifices some of these freedoms for the preservation of a state as a whole’ (Rousseau, 1762). In this case, the ‘state’ would be society in general, by which although the individual will have his own aims and interest, true common good or social sovereignty (not state sovereignty) should overpower man’s complete and utter individual freedom in society.

Freedom and suppression are inextricably linked in today’s society. State societies often argue that suppression is used as a mechanism for freedom of the society as a whole (Harvey, 2014). Harvey also argues that ‘to be free, someone else needs to be suppressed and exploited’. These repressive practices are blatantly obvious in the 21^st century such as in sweatshops in Eastern countries for example China, India and other Asian countries exhibit atrocious working conditions for not just adults but children also. These practices are often exploited by larger Western states, where freedom of choice and liberty ‘provides a license, it seems, to engage in a large range of repressive practices’ (Harvey, 2014). This idea of a society ensuring the safety of its members is also exacerbated with the 2004 legislations passed in Australia regarding data surveillance (EFA, 2004) where it was insisted that the Australian Surveillance Intelligence Organisation needed to have access to data and location tracking for the security, well-being and safety of Australia. Such surveillance is a concrete contemporary case where the sacrifice of individual privacy and freedom was crucial to the interest of the society.

Michel Foucault (1997) writes that it is not until all socially-constructed limits are realized and avoided that true freedom, or ‘ethos’ can be achieved. In a contemporary, interdependent society, ignoring the copious amounts of social influences for the freedom of a single individual is impossible, due to the way a society itself is constructed.

The Overriding Principle of State Sovereignty can no Longer Apply in a World of Borderless, Global Risks

Globalisation’s forces including increased fluidity of goods, capital, labour, mobility and communication, as well as the escalation of global risks and third-agenda issues, are now outdating the traditional or Westphalian idea of state sovereignty.

The two elements of state sovereignty, internal and external, both exert supreme authority over its territorial domain and have no higher power to answer to, as well as external sovereignty referring to a state’s autonomy in how it conducts itself on the international arena. However, often sovereignty is only acknowledged on an international level and not on a domestic one (Tansey, 2007). It is through the intensification of communication that the people of a state are becoming more aware and active in discussion about domestic and global policy. This shift causes a decentralization of internal sovereignty from the Westphalian aristocracy as governing body, to a socially democratic society having more influence over its authority. As Stiglitz illustrates, it is this ‘well-orchestrated public pressure’ that forces the authorities to adjust public and global policy (Stiglitz, pg. 5, 2003). Furthermore, it is the breakdown of these constructed state barriers that expose the political and economic policy of a state to the rest of the world, diminishing its privacy and overall sovereignty.

The challenges of globalisation that have arisen including those that are natural such as disease and climate change or global warming, have proved that there are some instances where sovereignty is irrelevant. Global crises such as those aforementioned threaten the globe as a whole and therefore it is in every state’s interest and obligation to act for the benefit and safety of the world as a whole, all self-interest aside. For example, with the recent 2014 outbreak of the Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa, Australia was not sending over healthcare personnel in fear that they would contract the virus, return to Australia and it would spread. However, Greens Senator Richard Di Natale contended that there were to be ‘no more excuses’ in regard to sovereignty-oriented inaction by the Australian government (Di Natale, 2014). Additionally, only recently has the discussion of environmental degradation and resource depletion come into political discourse. The action that needs to be taken in light of these limits to growth need to be considered as a shared responsibility, and that a state’s external sovereignty and self-interested [economic] pursuits need to be waived for the greater good of the collective society. These crises and threats to the twenty-first century ‘defy borders’ (Pascal & Benner, pg. 17, 2012).

One of the greatest forces to weaken sovereignty that resulted from globalisation is the largely influential institutions of global governance. The aim of governing the entire stage of sovereign states largely says enough about its achievement of diminishing a state’s ability to autonomously conduct itself on the international arena (Tansey, 2007). A blatant example is that of the conditionality (Stiglitz, 2003) that comes with international trade agreements. By attempting to enter a fair trade negotiation, a state may have to implement domestic policies against their will in order to gain the benefits of an international trade agreement, such as was the case in the 2001 World Trade Organisation’s Doha Development Rounds (Bayoumi, 2011).

In a more interconnected world than ever, it is impossible for the traditional or Westphalian concept of state sovereignty to have as stronger role thanks to the breakdown of traditional state barriers and the emergence of new, globally-concerning issues.

Does the United Nations Live up to any of the Ideals of Cosmopolitanism?

The concept of cosmopolitanism focuses on the promotion of ideals of equality, binding common humanity and therefore universal law and reason. The United Nations as an institution of global governance is an honest and exceptional attempt at pursuing these cosmopolitan ideals in both intention and natural unification.

The United Nations (UN) was constructed after the atrocities of World War II and was aimed at becoming a global government that strived to maintain international peace and security (UN, 1945). In order to do this, it needed to be concrete what the role of the UN Security Council was in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of peace-keeping and possible preventative action. However, in order to do so, the concept of global governance is dependent on overcoming the autonomy of the state; its sovereignty. As stated in article 53 of the UN Charter, it is at the UN’s authority to ensure that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council”. This is a distinct manifestation of cosmopolitan ideals in that the safety and moral worth of all human beings are of fundamental concern ‘irrespective of group membership’ (Fabre, pg. 965, 2008), and therefore it is at the UN’s determination (not the state’s) to ensure the safety of all global citizens.

The UN has received much criticism on its political rhetoric becoming distorted to ‘UN-approved code of conduct’ or more harshly, ‘the United Nations is already plotting its next invasion to deal with the fallout’ (Wolverton, 2012). This kind of disapproval brought about discussion of a linguistic shift from the right to intervene to the introduction of a state’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The UN’s R2P doctrine aims to promote more cosmopolitan practices within the UN by ensuring each individual state’s responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild (ICRtoP, 2005). This focus to a more human-rights based approach to intervention and prevention is fundamentally cosmopolitan in the way that it treats the safety and value of each human being and their right to feel protected. The UN then insists that if the state is unwilling or unable to uphold the responsibility that is obligatory to its sovereignty, then it is the role of the international community to protect its citizens (IDRC, 2001).

Immanuel Kant’s fourth proposition of cosmopolitanism is that individuals are continuously inclined to come together to create societal order as resistance to what threatens the society itself. Furthermore, Kant argues that the greatest task for mankind is to come together and abandon ‘a lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could derive its security and rights, not from its own power or its own legal judgement, but solely from this great federation, this united power, and the law-governed decisions of a united will’ (Kant, pg.20, 2010). The primary objectives of the UN was to uphold this exact mentality by ‘uniting our strength’ in the ‘common interest’ for the ‘advancement of all peoples’ (UN, 1945), a clear parallel of cosmopolitan rhetoric and ideals.

Although it may not be obvious in practice, the ideology of the UN is based on the essentials of a cosmopolitan society in which by combining the powers of every state to uphold international norms as a pursuit to achieve a ‘just civil constitution’ (Kant, pg. 20, 2010).

Economic liberalisation in trade: The case of Ghana and the Cocoa industry

Economic liberalisation in regard to trade and domestic industries is becoming a popular trend in the global political and economic arena. Through institutions of global governance such as the World Trade Organisation and the International Monetary Fund, many developed countries are politically and economically stable enough to restrict governmental regulations and implement more liberal market reforms in order to increase their foreign investment and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However there has been much debate regarding these kinds of reforms being placed upon developing states, which are not yet economically or politically stable enough for their economies to thrive under these conditions. In these cases, Stiglitz contends that ‘It has become increasingly clear that financial and capital market liberalization done hurriedly, without first putting into place an effective regulatory framework was at the core of the problem’ (Stiglitz, pg.1075, 2000). Supporting this statement, this paper will argue that rather than fully liberalising a developing state’s economy and/or implementing a free market system, a state-regulated market system or ‘partial liberalisation’, is more beneficial for a developing state. This is exemplified in Ghana’s cocoa industry, where liberalisation has occurred on smaller scale, but not on an international scale, where it may be easier for a developing state to be exploited and threatened by more stable states. It will also be explained how different aspects of economics and economic ideologies affect Ghana’s cocoa production, and how it can be improved by making sure regulation is effectively maintained.

The concept of liberalisation often holds positive connotations to individuals and society as a whole. Included in liberalisation is the idea of lessening the government’s control in order to let the market become more fluid and allowing the supply and the demand of the people to balance out the economy (Smith, 1776) and create a ‘vibrant, competitive private agricultural marketing sector, with direct state intervention only in cases of clear market failure’ (Hubbard & Smith, pg. 10, 1996). Milton and Rose Friedman argue that through government deregulation, privatisation and competition through self-interest and voluntary transactions, a free market ‘could coordinate the activity of millions of people, each seeking his own interest, in such a way as to make everyone better off.’ (Friedman & Friedman, 2003). On a global scale, liberalisation ensures more fluid flow of goods and services between states by implementing trade and agriculture reforms that aim to reduce barriers and tariffs between states. However in more developed states, businesses are more able to rely on government subsidies to support them, giving them a clear advantage, as opposed to developing states where there is no access to this kind of support and the reliance upon agriculture is far higher (Mutume, 1999).  In contrast to this, a state-regulated, only partially liberalized economy is one where the price signals are designated by the government (rather than determined purely by supply and demand), as well as welfare and regulation provided to allow fluidity of goods, while still managing the way business and trade can operate.  In developing economies, regulations can also protect vulnerabilities in financial crises, as well as monitor and regulate the activity of foreign investors (Oatley, 2012). Although some neoliberals argue that ‘economies can hardly be planned’ (Reed, 2008, pg. 1) and that globalisation’s forces are making us more interdependent, Oatley is more truthful to the developing world when he states that ‘no matter how “globalized” the world economy becomes, economic production will always be based in local communities’ (Oatley, pg. 180, 2012).

Marketing boards established in West Africa during and after the Second World War were at attempt at price stabilisation and trade regulation in a very insecure region at a very unsteady time. ‘The marketing boards managed the entire marketing process, buying cocoa directly from producers and selling it to traders and processors at a specified, guaranteed price at least for the whole cocoa season’ (Haque, pg.7, 2004). These boards were initially supported by both the World Bank and the IMF, however as economic liberalisation was on the rise, the IMF and World Bank deemed it essential that these boards were closed down, as there was evidence that the marketing boards were ineffective (Hubbard & Smith, 1996). Ghana’s government-operated cocoa marketing board opened in 1947 as Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB). However, Ghana’s independence in 1957 saw extreme political turmoil, liberalisation and exploitation of its cocoa industry, where not only did producer prices plummet to a low of 29%, but employment within the now corrupt private cocoa marketing sector was promoted for political means (Williams, 2009). It wasn’t until 1983 under the new leadership of Jerry Rawlings did Ghana’s economy and cocoa industry see massive structural reform which included freeing up resources, increasing producer prices, reducing the significant over employment in the government sector and the introduction of the new government institution of Cocoa Board (CocoBod). Unlike the prior neoliberal objective, ‘simply removing the state from marketing systems was not the solution’ (Cullinan, pg. 9, 1999). With farmer revenues now at 70%, as intended in the original CocoBod reform, it is clear that without the agency of the state to manage quality control and export prices, the previous neoliberal policies were ‘uniformly tarnished’ (Amoah, pg. 69, 1998).

Liberalising economies completely and having free market systems in developing states has failed them and often creates more loss and instability. Liberalisation is significantly damaging and exploitative to a developing economy through exploitation against stronger, already-established economies that are often largely subsidized. In the case of trade liberalisation, exemplified by the World Trade Organisations Doha Development Rounds in 2001, negotiations were made which required the developing world to reduce its trade barriers and tariffs in order to liberalise their markets to more foreign trade and investment and to “better integrate the more disadvantaged into the global economy” (IMF, 2011). However, often in these pressures from neoliberal organisations such as the WTO or the International Monetary Fund, there are no labour protection safeguards implemented in participating states, meaning there is possibility for exploitation, as well as stronger states (who in 2001 refused to relinquish their own subsidies) leading the negotiations and leaving developing states with no voice. In developing states where social welfare and protection are scarce, it is crucial that ‘governments must craft consistent global financial regulations to prevent a race to the bottom, where capital leaks out to the areas of the global economy with the weakest regulation’ (Rudd, pg. 75, 2010). Unfortunately it was calculated that after the eighth trade agreement in 1995 which aimed at reduced prices paid for imports by developing states, ‘the result was that some of the poorest countries in the world were actually made worse off’ (Stiglitz, 2003). The conditionality associated with such liberal policies far outweighs the benefits that the developing world receives.

The liberalisation that occurred post WWII was significantly detrimental to Ghana’s cocoa industry. The opening of trade barriers to international imports resulted in a tidal wave of new goods into Ghana, making the competition between domestic and international products particularly harsh, meaning producers are often selling less or at a lower price (Melamed, 2005). Although market liberalisation aims at ‘productive efficiency through an alignment of domestic prices with world prices and to give cocoa farmers improved prices…There was, in fact, some contradiction between the two goals since the increased production from liberalization would lower the world price, thereby lowering the price the cocoa farmer actually received’ (Haque, pg. 8, 2004). Without state support, Ghanaian farmers do not have access to capital or technology in order to improve productivity or quality. This internal liberalisation also included the introduction of private Licensed Buying Companies (LBC) that can in fact compete for producer’s business. The concentration of cocoa production in Ghana is less prominent in rural areas; therefore these buying companies tend to cluster in more concentrated production areas, leaving rural producers with longer waiting periods until their cocoa is taken to quality control and exporters.  On top of this, other developed states are heavily subsidized, such as farms in the United States receiving $256 billion in 2013 (EWG, 2013), leading to an extremely unfair and unequal market (Melamed, 2005). Additionally, soft commodities such as Cocoa require constant attention to the production and quality control process (Williams, 2009). This indicates that without state-regulated quality control and pricing, cocoa producers and farmers are can receive less based on the lack of appropriate pricing dependent on its geographical origin (Fold, 2001) and that ‘private actors can exploit an origin’s reputation by marketing sub-par product for the premium quality price’ (Williams, 2009). These liberal ideologies and policies altogether assume that creating a competitive market will add incentive for greater productivity and efficiency, and ignore the consequences and circumstances of differing markets (Stiglitz, 2000).

Ghana’s state-regulated market system in its cocoa production has led it to be one of the fastest growing economies, and the world’s third-largest cocoa producer (Haque, 2004). In Ghana, where cocoa exports can make up to 30% of total earnings (Haque, 2004) and employ up to 60% of its population (Williams, 2009), it is important not to fully liberalise its economy, as it is the only cocoa-producing country that has not done so (Anang, Adusei and Mintah, 2011). CocoBod’s role in plant breeding, price determination, quality control, market intelligence and extension services are crucial to Ghana’s cocoa industry growth. For example, in other countries, cocoa can be produced at 1800kg per hectare in Malaysia and 800kg per hectare in Cote D’Ivoire. However, in Ghana, land where cocoa is produced on smaller land mass and production can be as little 360kg per hectare, it is obvious that increased land size would improve productivity of cocoa though, due to cocoa farmers do not have capital to purchase such land, as well as there not being enough forest land for them to purchase. Therefore, the analysis shows that increased use of fertilizer and insecticides helps to ensure maximum capacity of premium quality beans, and so the government has introduced “spraying gangs”- government-sponsored employees that come and spray land where cocoa is being produced, at no cost to the farmer (Aneani, Anchirinah, Asamoah & Owusu-Ansah, 2011). On a higher level, it is also important for CocoBod to ensure that export prices are predetermined, ensured for the whole cocoa season, and not vulnerable to the harsh competition of the global trading arena. It is in the government’s interest to ensure and maintain these aspects of production, for example in origin and quality, origin plays a large role to the global cocoa industry (as facilitated by Cadbury), and therefore origin and quality must be properly regulated in order to receive the premium price. These kinds of certifications through government regulation can help to make sure that producers stay high on the value chain and receive optimum producer price and equity, as is the aim of protectionism and partial liberalisation. It is therefore imperative that on the global economic agenda, governments work ‘to negotiate international rules defining the respective rights and obligations’ of each states needs (Oatley, 2012).

Stiglitz asserts that ‘the international economic architecture must be designed to “work” not just in the presence of perfect economic management, but with the kind of fallible governments and public officials that in fact occur in democratic societies’ (Stiglitz, pg. 1075, 2000). Market liberalism not only reduces this kind of positive government influence, but forces developing states’ highly-relied upon industries into a whirlpool of global vulnerabilities. Ghana is a prime example of the benefits of a government-regulated market in a single industry and that although the CocoBod’s initiatives are not yet uniform to all farmers, the price appreciation and benefits from the government’s moderation far prevail over the negative pressures of market liberalisation.

References:

Amoah, J.E.K. (1998) Marketing of Ghana Cocoa: 1885–1992, Accra, Ghana: Jemre Enterprises

Anang, B. T., Adusei, K., & Mintah, E. (2011), Farmers’ Assessment of Benefits and Constraints of Ghana’s Cocoa Sector Reform, Current research journal of social sciences, vol. 3, no. 4, 358-363

Aneani, F., V.M., Anchirinah, M., Asamoah, Owusu-Ansah, F. (2011), Analysis of Economic Efficiency in Cocoa Production in Ghana, Afri. J.Food Agric. Nutr. Dev., vol. 11 no 1, pg. 4507-4526

Asante-Poku A., Angelucci F., (2013), Analysis of incentives and disincentives for cocoa in Ghana, Technical notes series, MAFAP, FAO, Rome http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/mafap/documents/technical_notes/GHANA/GHANA_Technical_Note_COCOA_EN_Apr2013.pdf (September 9th, 2014)

Ashitey, E. (2012), Cocoa Report Annual, Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN), USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Ghana Cocoa Board, International Cocoa Organisation

Cullinan, C. (1999), Law and Markets: Improving the Legal Environment for Agricultural Marketing, FAO Agricultural Services Bulletin 139, Rome, FAO

Environmental Working Group (2013), Farm Subsidy Database

Fold, N., (2001), ‘Restructuring of the European Chocolate Industry and its Impact on Cocoa Production in West Africa, Journal of Economic Geography, vol. 1, no. 3, 405-420

Friedman, M., & Friedman, R., (2003), ‘The Power of the Market’, Economics as a Social Science: Readings in Political Economy, Argyrous, G. & Stilwell, F., 2nd ed., Pluto Press Australia, Sydney, pp. 126-131.

Hubbard, M., Smith, M., (1996) Agricultural Marketing Sector Review, The Role of Government in Adjusting Economies, Paper 6, Birmingham: University of Birmingham Development Administration Group

International Monetary Fund (2011), The WTO Doha Trade Round—Unlocking the Negotiations and Beyond, IMF Strategy, Policy and Review Department (approved by Tamim Bayoumi)

Melamed, C. (2005), How Import Liberalisation Cost Africa $272 Billion, South-North Development Monitor (SUNS, issue no. 5832)

Mutume, G. (1999), WTO agricultural liberalisation may hurt small-scale farmers, Third World Network (TWN) http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/scale.htm (October 4th, 2014)

Oatley, T. (2012) ‘The politics of multinational corporations’, International Political Economy, 5th ed., Pearson Longman, Boston, pp. 180-201

Reed, L. (2008) (1958) Introduction, Pencil: My Family Tree as Told to Leonard E. Read, Foundation for Economic Education, New York

Rudd, K (2010), ‘Social Democracy and the Global Financial Crisis’, in Manne, R & McKnight, D (eds.), Goodbye to all that: On the failure of neo-liberalism and the urgency of change, Black Inc, Melbourne, pp. 73-76 & 86-98

Smith, A (1776), The Wealth of Nations vol. IV, University of Chicago Press

Stiglitz, J. E. (2000), Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth and Instability, The World Bank, Elsevier Science Ltd, Washington D.C

Stiglitz, J. E. (2003), ‘The promise of global institutions’, Globalization and its discontents, Rev. ed., W.W. Norton, New York, pp. 3-22

Ul Haque, I. (2004), Commodities under Neoliberalism: The case of cocoa, UN

Williams, T. (2009), An African Success Story: Ghana’s Cocoa Marketing System, Institute of Development Studies, vol. 2009: no. 318

World Bank (2007), “World Development Report: Agriculture for Development” , Washington, DC: World Bank” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/2795087-1192111580172/WDROver2008-ENG.pdf (September 9th, 2014)

R2P – The Responsibility to Protect

Humanitarian or military intervention is and almost always has been a contentious issue in the international community and within institutions of global governance. However, in response to the Rwandan and Srebrenica genocides in 1995, which killed a combined estimate of over 800,000 civilians[1], the hot debate arose of whether the concept of state sovereignty and security should be overruled by a state’s responsibility to protect its own civilians and their rights. In 2000, United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan asserted that the UN must uphold its role in maintaining international peace and security, that human rights abuses and crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and rape are or paramount priority of human protection, and that “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”[2]. Following these uproars on the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens, Canadian organisation the ‘International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’ (ICISS) released The Responsibility to Protect, a comprehensive report on the solidity of state sovereignty[3]but also the emphasis on the importance and upholding of human rights, and the claim that with state sovereignty comes great responsibility that includes protecting its citizens. This paper will outline the redefinition of sovereignty, the R2P concept, structure and challenges, its inextricable link with the UN, as well as R2P’s current presence, and its crucial role in a changing global environment post its emergence in 2005.

R2P is based on three core responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild. These foundations entail addressing to roots of the issues presented, the right to respond with appropriate measures such as sanctions, prosecution and military intervention as last resort. These core objectives are based on not only the UN’s aim of maintaining international peace and security[4], but the yielding responsibility that comes with state sovereignty that if a state is unwilling or unable to avert serious harm, it becomes the responsibility of the international community.[5] Much like the UN, the ICC and other upholders of international human rights and peace, there is no real sense of ‘enforcement’ of R2P, therefore it relies on the UN to pass resolutions on R2P abuses, as well as various R2P coalitions around the world. Coalitions such as ICRtoP (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect) that works with NGO’s to standardize the concept of R2P and strengthen action and consensus on R2P[6]. As mentioned, some are wary that R2P is an opportunity for stronger states to exercise their strong military or hard power, however when a situation arises, it is preferable that more peaceful actions such as sanctions or international prosecutions, are taken to deter violence and human rights abuses, before any military action is taken. There are a set of criteria for military action if it is deemed necessary to diminish the situation. These criteria include: (i) the just cause threshold (necessary if there is a large loss of life or ethnic cleansing is occurring), (ii) precautionary principles (reasonable means and prospects, last resort, and right intention), (iii) the right authority or most appropriate body (generally the UNSC is deemed as most appropriate) and finally (iv) clear operational objectives and execution techniques[7]. Generally, these measures are negotiated through the means of the UN Security Council (UNSC), which although “the big 5” consisting of China, Russia, the US, France and the UK, has the power to veto resolutions, when cases of R2P come forward, it has been agreed that veto power would not be used. At the Global Philanthropy Forum in 2008, Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister and President of the International Crisis Group, stated “coercive military intervention only as an absolute last resort after a number of very clearly defined criteria have been met and after the approval of the Security Council has been obtained”[8]. As aforementioned, the UN will apply various measures and pressures upon the states abusing human rights, and will only apply military pressure once it has been deemed necessary. This process strongly distinguishes R2P from, and prevents, large (particularly western) states using power to intervene for political gain or national interest.

Although R2P was not always considered ‘international law’, it is highly implied in the UN charter that each state must uphold and protect its citizen’s rights[9]. However, in 2005 at the United Nation’s World Summit Outcome, R2P was explicitly referenced in articles 138-139 which state “Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept this responsibility and will act in accordance with it…”[10] On top of this, the international community is more human rights-based and bound by common humanity than ever, thanks to the interconnectedness produced by globalization. This in turn almost makes the protection and safety of any citizens a ‘third agenda issue’: one that can only be solved through the cooperation of the international community for the goal of universal human rights, which should be in every state’s interest. However, in such a changing, globalised environment where religious ideologies, civil conflicts, asymmetrical warfare and exploitation are prominent, it was important to many states that the R2P doctrine was not an exacerbation of states’ rights to intervene and invade. R2P altered the linguistics to ensure that it was not allowing states’ to “exercise their right to intervene”, but exercising civilians’ rights to be protected from severe harm or danger.[11]

The Libyan civil war, beginning in 2011, is a concrete example of R2P’s principles and objectives being applied, as well as highlighting its progress since its official founding in 2001. When the Qadaffi regime first came into play, the UNSC passed resolution 1970 which strongly condemned the regime’s actions, as referring the case to the International Criminal Court, placed arms embargoes and other restrictions, as well as sanctioning significant regime figures. Following this, recognizing Qadaffi’s failure to comply with said requests and resolutions, the UNSC approved resolution 1973 in March of the same year, applying a “no-fly zone” over Libya.[12] These progressive actions taken by the UNSC in the name of R2P, asserted that R2P was more than just “political rhetoric”[13] and that it was indeed coming to be. Although many criticisms arose, some criticizing the UN’s authority to take military measures, others arguing that preventative measures should have been taken, or at least more action should have been taken. Nevertheless, in Gareth Evans’ words, “by any familiar historical standard, that’s not a bad set of measures for the internationals to agree on”[14] Contrastingly, following the Libyan conflict and its UNSC resolutions, when the Syrian civil war arose, much less action (approximately 9 resolutions) was taken by UNSC, almost all of which did nothing but attempt to provide humanitarian aid and condemn the regime’s actions. The first meaningful resolution to be passed was in September 2013, ordering Syria to destroy all chemical weapons stockpiles in an attempt to cease or diminish the violence occurring. The public response to this action (or lack thereof) from the UNSC was very negative, many claiming that it was not enough action. However, once military or physical intervention was suggested on the basis of R2P, it was little understood that it was the US acting on behalf of the UNSC and the international community attempting to initiate R2P after the chemical attacks, with a 19% of US citizens voting affirmative to the US intervening.[15] The situation in Libya was the first real attempt at the UNSC implementing the R2P Doctrine in a practical sense. This unfortunately deterred states (and therefore the UNSC) to implement further action in Syria in the years after, not to mention the difficulties that came with Russia and China’s relationships with Syria, and their veto power. Nonetheless it is to be understood that R2P does not oblige states to intervene and therefore diminish their sovereignty[16], but in fact reminding states (particularly UN signatories) that “its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and underlining the importance of taking measures aimed at conflict prevention and resolution”, according the R2P’s first presence in UNSC resolution 1964.[17]

The ICISS Commission states that, when referring to R2P, “when states are unwilling or unable to do so, the responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states”[18]. Sometimes the responsibility may indeed need to be taken on by other states or the UN itself. Then again, in early 2012, when Northern Mali was being infiltrated by Islamic radicals, the government realized that the Tuareg rebels were too much for their state to handle, and that they could not fulfill their R2P. Malian Prime Minister Cheick Mobido Diarra appealed to French President Francois Hollande to persuade the UNSC to take action and help Mali claim its territory and relieve it from its coup. By June 2013, the UNSC Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon welcomed a signing of agreement between the rebel group and the Malian government, and an election date had been set for July 2013.  This R2P process was achieved with the significant help of troops sent by France, ECOWAS and the African Union, as well as great support from the African Union, and other states in the region such as Nigeria[19]. However, online American magazine “The New American” brutally criticized the response to the Malian conflict, the UN and above all the concept of R2P. ‘The New American’ stated that after Libya, “the United Nations is already plotting its next invasion to deal with the fallout” and that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon “reaffirmed the commitment of the global shadow government’s ultimate goal of eradicating national sovereignty”. On top of this, R2P and the UN face criticisms such as that “R2P purports to grant the global government power to decide whether an individual nations are properly exercising their sovereignty”, and that R2P is a “weapon in this war of self-determination”. Unfortunately, strong senses of sovereignty and realism dominate some interpretations of R2P, and human rights, and rights to security and protection become muffled and translated to “UN-approved code of conduct”.[20]

With globalisation now in full-form, we are more interconnected and bound by common humanity than ever, therefore need to move away from realism and more toward cosmopolitanism and motivate the international community to work together on third-agenda issues such as the safety of civilians and international peace and security, as stated in the UN Charter.[21] Most action taken on the basis of R2P is indeed enforced or done by the UN and UNSC, and some argue that by the UN being the front of R2P, it can undermine the abilities of R2P coalitions, the ICC and the international community in general, can do. However, what needs to be less ambiguous and better understood, is that the UN and R2P are not synonymous. R2P is a concept, a concept advocating equality and cosmopolitan ethos protecting the rights of civilians, regardless of state or borders, and that it is not aggressive intervention, but provides “helpful benchmarks on how to judge intervention”[22] (such as those in Mali and Libya), and above all, protection.

References:

Al Jazeera (2012), Mali’s PM Calls for Foreign Intervention, Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/09/201292755022310928.html (May 14th, 2014)

ICISS (2001), The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Development Research Centre, December 2001, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf

Kersten, M. (2013), A Fatal Attraction: The UN Security Council and the Relationship Between R2P and the International Criminal Court, Justice In Conflict.org, http://justiceinconflict.org/2013/02/27/a-fatal-attraction-the-un-security-council-and-the-relationship-between-r2p-and-the-international-criminal-court/  (May 12^th, 2014)

Luck, E. C., (2009), Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect, Global responsibility to protect, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Vol.1 (1)

Noraras, M., Popovski, V. (2005), The Responsibility to Protect, United Nations University, http://unu.edu/publications/articles/responsibility-to-protect-and-the-protection-of-civilians.html

Stahn (2007) , ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ vol. 101, The AmericanJournal of International Law, pgs 99-120

Standnow, Responsibility to Protect, Washington, D.C. , http://www.standnow.org/learn/responsibility (May 11th, 2014)

Sullivan, A., (2013), U.S Public Opposes Syria Intervention as Obama Presses Congress, Reuters, Washington D.C, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/03/us-syria-crisis-usa-idUSBRE97T0NB20130903 (May 14th, 2014)

Tanguy, J. (2003), Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention [Review of ‘The Responsibility to Protect, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ethics & International Affairs, 2 vols., Ottawa: International Development Research Centre

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24^th October 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf

United Human Rights Council, Genocide in Rwanda, Armenian Youth Federation – Western United States, http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm (May 12th, 2014)

United Nations, 60/1 World Summit Outcome: article 138, pg. 30, October 2005 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf

United Nations Security Council report (2014), UN Documents for Syria, United Nations Security Council, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/syria/ (May 14^th, 2014)

USUN (2011), Fact Sheet: UN Security Council Resolution 1970, Libya Sanctions, United States Mission to the United Nations http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2011/157194.htm (May 14th, 2014)

WFMC (2013), The Responsibility to Protect…in Mali: Benchmarks for Effective Canadian Policy, World Federalists Canada, http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/documents/022513WFMCreR2PMali.pdf (May 11th, 2014)

[1] United Human Rights Council, Genocide in Rwanda, Armenian Youth Federation – Western United States, http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm (May 12th, 2014)

[2] Annan, K., (2000) United Nations Millennium Report, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/54/2000 (May 11th, 2014)

[3] United Nations, Charter of the United Nations: article 2.1, October 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf

[4] United Nations, Charter of the United Nations: article 24, October 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf

[5] The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Development Research Centre, December 2001, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf

[6] International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ (May 11^th, 2014)

[7] R2P Coalition, Basic Principles and Core Elements, 2006 R2P Coalition, http://r2pcoalition.org/content/view/73/93/  (May 11^th, 2014)

[8] Evans, G. (2008), The Responsibility to Protect – Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes, Global Philanthropy Forum, California, https://philanthropyforum.org/sessions/the-responsibility-to-protectnending-mass-atrocity-crimes/ (May 14^th, 2014)

[9] United Nations, Charter of the United Nations: article 55, October 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf

[10] United Nations, 60/1 World Summit Outcome: article 138, pg. 30, October 2005

[11] Standnow, Responsibility to Protect, Washington, D.C. , http://www.standnow.org/learn/responsibility (May 11th, 2014)

[12] USUN (2011), Fact Sheet: UN Security Council Resolution 1970, Libya Sanctions, United States Mission to the United Nations http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2011/157194.htm (May 14th, 2014)

[13] C. Stahn (2007) , ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ vol. 101, The American Journal of International Law, pgs 99-120

[14] Evans, G. (2008), The Responsibility to Protect – Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes, Global Philanthropy Forum, California, https://philanthropyforum.org/sessions/the-responsibility-to-protectnending-mass-atrocity-crimes/

[15] Sullivan, A., (2013), U.S Public Opposes Syria Intervention as Obama Presses Congress, Reuters, Washington D.C, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/03/us-syria-crisis-usa-idUSBRE97T0NB20130903 (May 14th, 2014)

[16] Luck, E. C., (2009), Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect, Global responsibility to protect, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Vol. 1 (1), 13-24

[17] United Nations Security Council (2006), United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1964 (2006), United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1674(2006) (May 12^th, 2014)

[18] The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Development Research Centre, December 2001, pg. viii  http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf

[19] Al Jazeera (2012), Mali’s PM Calls for Foreign Intervention, Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/09/201292755022310928.html (May 14th, 2014)

[20] Wolverton, J., Mali: Target of UN’s Sovereignty-Stealing “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine, The New American: That Freedom Shall Not Perish, http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/africa/item/13203-mali-target-of-uns-sovereignty-stealing-responsibility-to-protect-doctrine (May 13th, 2014)

[21] United Nations, Charter of the United Nations: article 24, October 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf

[22] Tanguy, J. (2003), Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention [Review of ‘The Responsibility to Protect, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ethics & International Affairs, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, pg. 7